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WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE COMPLIANCE
ERA
Jeffrey R. Boles,* Leora Eisenstadt,† & Jennifer M. Pacella‡
International events over the last year have propelled the
importance of whistleblowers to the forefront. It is increasingly
evident that whistleblowers provide immense value to society.
Yet, for years, whistleblowers have been victims of retaliation,
commonly experiencing threats, discrimination, and
employment termination due to their reporting. Against the
backdrop of a society heavily defined by compliance-focused
initiatives—where organizations and industries construct
robust compliance programs, internal policies, and codes of
conduct—this Article highlights a significant gap in legal
protections for would-be whistleblowers. While compliance
initiatives demonstrate that active self-regulation is
increasingly a staple of organizational governance, this Article
pinpoints the problems that arise when such initiatives extend
beyond applicable legal thresholds for retaliation protection.
This over-extension leaves vulnerable employees and potential
whistleblowers without legal recourse following adverse
employment actions, even if they comply with their employers’
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internal policies and compliance programs. We examine this
gap in legal protections in the context of compliance initiatives
in three domains: equal employment opportunity and sexual
harassment; securities fraud; and anti-corruption. We then
compare these initiatives with the legal and regulatory
compliance postures under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
respectively, to illustrate how most compliance initiatives fail
to mirror the retaliation protections under those statutes. To
remedy this gap in protections, we propose complementary
solutions under contract and tort law frameworks, coupled
with soft law initiatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the compliance industry has grown dramatically
in the last several decades.1 In response to various financial
scandals, the passage of new legislation, and influential court
rulings, both large and small companies have expanded their
compliance programs and hired more personnel to combat financial
fraud, avoid corruption, and eliminate workplace discrimination
and harassment.2 We now live in a compliance-focused world, where
numerous companies proactively implement compliance policies
and programs that exceed legal requirements.3 While this expansion
may generally be viewed as a positive development for regulatory
compliance, one key population of employees has been made
significantly worse off in the process: whistleblowers.4 In the areas
of financial fraud, corruption, discrimination, harassment, and
diversity, employees who come forward to report violations of
company compliance policies are often left unprotected by law and
are vulnerable to retaliatory acts such as termination or demotion.5
In the rush to build more robust compliance apparatuses,
whistleblowers—who serve a vital role in unearthing and
preventing inappropriate, dangerous, unethical, and often unlawful
behavior—have been left defenseless.6
1 See Jennifer M. Pacella, The Regulation of Lawyers in Compliance, 95 WASH. L. REV. 947,
953 (2020) (noting that compliance has “emerged as one of the most vibrant sources of
employment and research for the legal field as a whole”).
2 See Geoffrey Parsons Miller, Compliance: Past, Present and Future, 48 U. TOL. L. REV.
437, 438 (2017) (stating that compliance departments have grown and now must respond to
“underlying compliance risks”); Pacella, supra note 1, at 955 (noting that “growth of the
compliance function has come about largely as a response to the extraordinary complexity in
regulation over recent decades”); Alison Leigh Cowan, Compliance Officers’ Day in the Sun,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/business/complianceofficers-day-in-the-sun.html (noting that attitudes towards compliance changed after a
“scandal at Salomon Brothers” and that compliance officers’ “salaries and staffs” grew to
comply with “complicated securities laws”).
3 See Cowan, supra note 2 (“Today, compliance departments at the biggest brokerage firms
tend to go well beyond the dictates of law or industry rules.”).
4 See discussion infra Parts II–IV.
5 See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 152 (2014)
(“Employees risk being labeled unreasonable and left unprotected from retaliation for
stepping forward to complain about discrimination . . . .”).
6 See discussion infra Parts II–IV.
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In 1991, The New York Times published an article examining the
compliance industry’s expansion following the collapse of
investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert and the treasury bond
“scandal” at Salomon Brothers.7 Suddenly, the author noted, “the
attitude [was] that no amount of compliance policing is too much.”8
She highlighted the growth of compliance departments, the
dramatic increase in compliance executives’ salaries, and the newly
respected positions they began to occupy at banking and other
firms.9
If the 1990s brought growth and new prestige to compliance
departments, the twenty-first century has dramatically intensified
that process, bringing a veritable explosion of the industry. By 2005,
The New York Times reported that, in the wake of scandals at Enron
and WorldCom and the subsequent passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act (SOX),10 “[c]ompliance is becoming an industry unto itself.”11
Whereas prior to SOX’s passage in 2002, “there was no such thing
as a chief compliance officer at most of the roughly 9,000 publicly
held corporations in the United States[, n]ow in-house
watchdogs . . . are required at all these companies.”12
The growth of the compliance industry dramatically accelerated
again after the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009.13 Experts largely
attributed the recession to a lack of oversight and regulation of
financial institutions, and this sentiment culminated in the passage
of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Cowan, supra note 2.
Id.
9 Id. (“Compliance officers . . . are now enjoying an elevated status. Today, they often report
more directly to top executives and company boards. Their salaries and staffs are growing,
and some firms engage in bidding wars to recruit them.”); see also Pacella, supra note 1, at
948 (asserting that the compliance field has established itself as “its own distinct discipline”
and that compliance officers’ roles have moved “to the forefront”); Miller, supra note 2, at 438
(“Compliance officer salaries have greatly increased and compliance departments have
exploded in size and importance.”).
10 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2018).
11 Harry Hurt III, Drop That Ledger! This Is the Compliance Officer, N.Y. TIMES (May 15,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/business/yourmoney/drop-that-ledger-this-isthe-compliance-officer.html (quoting Joseph A. Grundfest, Professor of Law and Business at
Stanford Law School).
12 Id.
13 See Pacella, supra note 1, at 955 (“The focus on compliance . . . was enhanced in the wake
of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 . . . .”).
7
8
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Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank).14 Dodd–Frank once again
required expansion of policies, procedures, and personnel to ensure
compliance with the new broad-based financial regulation.15 The
New York Times dubbed the law “Dodd–Frank Inc.,” referring to the
“legions of corporate accountants, financial consultants, risk
management advisers, turnaround artists and technology vendors,”
in addition to the lawyers, who would be hired in the wake of its
passage.16 More recently, many industries see continued increases
in compliance efforts related to anti-money laundering (AML),
cybersecurity, and predictive analytics.17
In addition to regulatory changes in the financial arena, case law
and related regulation concerning employment discrimination law
and affirmative action spurred an equally dramatic compliance
expansion in the equal employment opportunity (EEO) domain,
with exponential growth in policies and personnel resembling that
of compliance in the finance domain.18 A pair of U.S. Supreme Court
opinions from the late 1990s created an affirmative defense to
discrimination and harassment claims that incentivized the
creation of elaborate policies and procedures to prohibit
discrimination and harassment and respond to related claims that
arise.19 In addition, arising partly in response to affirmative action
requirements placed on government contractors and an increasing
14 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2018) (providing protection against retaliation for securities laws
whistleblowers); see also Pacella, supra note 1, at 955 (discussing how focus on compliance
increased after the financial crisis); James A. Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms:
A New Mission for the Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 14 (2013) (noting
that Dodd–Frank prompted an increase in work for compliance officers); GEOFFREY PARSONS
MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 137–39 (1st ed.
2014) (discussing other landmarks in the history of compliance).
15 See Pacella, supra note 1, at 955 (attributing further post-recession focus on compliance
to Dodd–Frank).
16
Eric
Dash, Feasting
on
Paperwork, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/business/dodd-frank-paperwork-a-bonanza-forconsultants-and-lawyers.html?searchResultPosition=1.
17 Todd Ehret, Compliance Job Market Shows Strength in AML and Financial Crime as
Other Areas Slow, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finregcompliance-market/compliance-job-market-shows-strength-in-aml-and-financial-crime-asother-areas-slow-idUSKBN1522WG (noting that “hiring has become more targeted in specific
areas” such as AML and cyber security).
18 See infra Section II.A.
19 See infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text.
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belief in the business benefits of diversity, the number of compliance
personnel dedicated to diversity and inclusion has dramatically
grown in the last several years with numerous companies
appointing chief diversity officers and expanding their compliance
departments to include discrimination, diversity, and related
issues.20 Finally, both the #MeToo and Black Lives Matter
movements have catapulted companies’ efforts regarding sexual
harassment, anti-racism, and workplace culture issues, again
leading to renewed attention to EEO compliance personnel,
practices, and procedures.21
20 See, e.g., Bloomberg News, Kmart Diversity Officer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/14/business/kmart-diversity-officer.html (announcing a
new “chief diversity officer” position at the Kmart Corporation); Mike Isaac, Pinterest Hires
Its First Head of Diversity, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Jan. 6, 2016, 12:00 PM),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/pinterest-hires-its-first-head-of-diversity
(discussing actions by Pinterest, Twitter, and Facebook to increase personnel and programs
dedicated to diversity efforts); see also Elizabeth Olson, 150 Executives Commit to Fostering
Diversity
and
Inclusion,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
12,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/dealbook/work-racist-sexism-diversity.html
(“[N]ew initiative, C.E.O. Action for Diversity and Inclusion, will announce on Monday that
150 corporate executives have committed to their companies’ encouraging their employees to
discuss those sensitive topics. Procter & Gamble, New York Life, Accenture, Deloitte U.S. and
the Boston Consulting Group are among the companies that have joined the alliance . . . . The
group is sponsoring a website, ceoaction.com, which has more than 70 examples of the most
effective efforts developed by companies, including flexible work practices and gender equality
programs.”).
21 See Sarkis Jebejian, David B. Feirstein, Lauren O. Casazza, Kim B. Nemirow, Shaun J.
Mathew, Lisa Madigan & Erica Williams, #MeToo Compliance — Two Years In, “Wait-andSee” Is No Longer an Option, KIRKLAND GOVERNANCE UPDATE (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.kirkland.com/publications/kirkland-governance-update/2019/10/metoocompliance (“Over the past two years, the #MeToo movement has driven major societal
change and reform, exposing areas for improvement in workplace compliance across the
country. It has also led to a paradigm shift, turning allegations of workplace sexual
misconduct at some companies from isolated HR matters into potential enterprise-level risks
similar to the threats of cybersecurity breaches or corruption.”); Katie Benner, SoFi Board
Says C.E.O. Is Out Immediately Amid Sexual Harassment Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/technology/sofi-cagney-scandal.html (“SoFi joins
the ranks of technology start-ups that have had to contend with serious issues related to
workplace culture. Other companies in that category include the blood testing start-up
Theranos, the insurance start-up Zenefits and, perhaps most prominently, the ride-hailing
company Uber, whose chief executive, Travis Kalanick, stepped down amid a spate of
scandals.”); Tiffany Hsu, Corporate Voices Get Behind ‘Black Lives Matter’ Cause, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/business/media/companies-marketingblack-lives-matter-george-floyd.html (stating that some companies are aligning with the
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While the growth of compliance departments and programs is
often reactive to litigation, regulation, and statutory changes,
current compliance initiatives often “go well beyond the dictates of
law or industry rules.”22 For example, anti-corruption initiatives—
which aim at creating broad, globally applicable policies—often
prohibit more conduct than federal law prohibits.23 In addition, antifraud policies often impose internal reporting duties and other
responsibilities on employees, which federal law does not protect.24
Further, employee handbooks and EEO codes often describe
discrimination, harassment and other inappropriate workplace
conduct in ways that differ from federal statutes and case law and
prohibit behaviors that are not unlawful under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act (Title VII)25 or other anti-discrimination statutes.26 From
the perspective of risk management and ethical business practices,
company initiatives that are more prescriptive than legal mandates
are good programs.27 Compliance departments aiming to create
healthy workplace cultures, increase diversity, encourage
responsible financial practices, and avoid potential legal liability
should craft policies with legal requirements as prescriptive guides,
not outside boundaries.
The danger in exceeding legal requirements, however, is to the
employee whistleblowers who come forward to report violations of
the employers’ internal policy. The enormous expansions of
compliance infrastructure typically have not included legal
protections for whistleblowers.28 In fact, the opposite may be true.
Workers who report violations—whether it is sexual harassment,

Black Lives Matter movement); Greg Bensinger, Opinion, Corporate America Says Black
Lives Matter. It Needs to Hold Up a Mirror, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/opinion/black-lives-matter-corporate-pledges.html
(indicating that companies have used Black Lives Matter protests to boast about
commitments to diversity).
22 Cowan, supra note 2.
23 See infra Part IV.
24 See infra Part III.
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012) (codifying equal employment opportunities).
26 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2018) (prohibiting
age discrimination in employment); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–17
(2012) (prohibiting disability discrimination in employment).
27 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
28 See infra Parts II–IV.
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bribes, or financial fraud—face an uncertain and decidedly insecure
future. Whistleblowers who report conduct prohibited by company
policy—but not by law—are left legally unprotected should they
experience retaliation, even if internal company policy promises
non-retaliation.29 Additionally, companies often present internal
codes as the “law” of the company, making no distinction between
“illegal acts” and “company code violations.”30 Average workers who
attempt to adhere to their company’s code of conduct by reporting
violations are often unaware of whether they are reporting
violations of law or company code, leaving them legally
unprotected.31
This Article is the first piece of scholarship to examine the
consequences for whistleblowers when compliance programs exceed
the bounds of law in three areas: EEO compliance, anti-fraud codes,
and anti-corruption programs. We analyze protections available
under Title VII and related anti-discrimination statutes for those
who report discrimination and harassment as well as protections
available under SOX, Dodd–Frank, and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) for those who report financial fraud, bribes,
and other forms of corruption.32 More importantly, we examine the
limits of those laws and the extent to which employees coming
forward to report compliance code violations are not protected
against retaliation under these federal statutes.
It is untenable that no legal recourse exists for workers who
diligently adhere to company policy, risk their livelihoods to report
bad acts—which the company insists it wants to know about and
remedy—and then face demotion, termination, or other adverse
actions by a rogue supervisor, manager, or constituent of the
organization. To address this problem, we propose several legal and
regulatory measures to protect compliance whistleblowers both
individually and collectively. Specifically, we propose individual
solutions, including contract law alternatives and the tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. We also propose
29 See infra Sections II.B., III.B., & IV.B. These non-retaliation promises generally are
legally unenforceable. See infra Section II.B.
30 See infra Section II.B.
31 Id.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2018) (prohibiting certain foreign trade practices by issuers of
stock).
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forward-looking, collective measures including modifications to the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (the Sentencing
Guidelines), the DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations within the Justice Manual. These reforms are
necessary both to protect employees who suffer under this unfair
system and to incentivize companies to amend their compliance
codes to make promises to whistleblowers legally enforceable.
Whistleblowers provide an unmatched source of information
essential to a company’s ability to avoid criminal and civil liability
and to increase productivity and efficiency.33 Whistleblowers are
vital to society’s orderly functioning,34 and they should be protected
by law when providing this service.

II. BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON HARASSMENT AND
DISCRIMINATION
Since the late 1990s, companies have been creating ever-larger
programs and departments to maintain compliance with antidiscrimination laws and regulations and, more generally, to create
diverse workplaces. These programs respond, in large part, to the
requirements set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,35 all of which prohibit
discrimination in the workplace on the basis of protected
characteristics.36 The need to comply with this group of federal
See Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jennifer M. Pacella, Whistleblowers Need Not Apply, 55 AM.
BUS. L.J. 665, 674 (2018) (“[P]ublic policy supports the protection of whistleblowers generally,
as the information they provide is beneficial to a wide range of societal interests.”).
34 See id. at 671–74 (discussing whistleblowers’ role in fraud detection and how common law
understood that role as furthering public policy).
35 Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and ethnicity when
making and enforcing contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (“All persons within . . . the United
States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”); see also Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (finding the
scope of § 1981 includes discrimination based on race, ethnic, and physiognomic distinctions).
36 Protected characteristics under the listed statutes include race, color, sex, religion,
national origin, age, and disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2018) (declaring employment
discrimination based on age unlawful); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (ensuring an equal right to
freedom of contract regardless of race); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination
in employment on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 42 U.S.C. §
33
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statutes, an increasing belief in the importance of diversity and
inclusion, and—in some companies—affirmative action programs,
have spawned an entire industry of professionals and innumerable
policies, procedure documents, resources, and best practices
guides.37 Although many of these developments have created much
needed change in corporate culture, the resulting situation has left
many employees, who report violations of EEO policies, without
legal protection and thus subject to termination, demotion, or other
adverse action.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EEO COMPLIANCE INDUSTRY

The EEO compliance industry, as it has come to be known, has
grown in importance over the last thirty years and now plays a
central role in many companies.38 A 2018 study by the Society for
Human Resource Management (SHRM) found that ninety-four
percent of Human Resources professionals reported that their
companies had an existing policy to prevent sexual harassment in
the workplace.39 As of 2016, about sixty percent of Fortune 500
companies had implemented diversity programs or hired diversity
officers, and a coalition of high-ranking representatives from fortysix companies launched a movement to achieve gender parity in the
corporate world by 2030, showing growing dedication to internal
12101(b)(1) (2012) (creating a “national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities”).
37 See Brake, supra note 5, at 128–34 (2014) (discussing the growth of internal antidiscrimination policies in American workplaces over the past several decades).
38 See generally FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009) (tracking how
companies’ personnel experts have driven the development of equal opportunity in the
workplace).
39 SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., HARASSMENT-FREE WORKPLACE SERIES: THE EXECUTIVE
VIEW
3
(2018),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-andsurveys/Documents/Harassment-Free%20Workplace%20Series%20Executive%20View%20
Topline.pdf. SHRM invited approximately 18,000 employees—including executives,
managers and non-managers—to complete the survey and received responses from employees
in over fifteen industries, representing employers of all sizes. Id. at 10 (describing the study’s
methodology); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph
of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 19–20 (2003)
(discussing a 1999 SHRM study reporting “that ninety-seven percent of responding employers
have written policies against sexual harassment” with procedures and administrative
personnel in place to handle claims and investigations).
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diversity and inclusion in the American workplace.40 As Deborah
Brake notes:
Perhaps the most significant development in
employment discrimination law in the past two decades
is the extent to which internal EEO policies and
complaint procedures have become normalized in the
American workplace. They are overseen and
implemented
by
compliance
personnel
with
responsibility over EEO matters, including but not
limited
to
the
legal
requirements
of
nondiscrimination.41
The growth in EEO compliance personnel and policies is largely
attributable to judicial decisions that incentivized employer action.
The most obvious cause is a pair of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
handed down in 1998: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton42 and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.43 Together, these decisions
created an affirmative defense to claims of sexual harassment by a
supervisor that involves the creation of policies and procedures to
prevent and respond to claims of harassment.44 Ironically, despite
an almost complete absence of evidence in social science literature
about the effectiveness of policies and procedures in preventing
harassment in the workplace, Justice Kennedy opined in Ellerth
that “the very purpose of Title VII is ‘to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.’”45 As
a result—and perhaps based on a misperception on the Court’s
part—an entire industry developed.

40 See DIVERSITY BEST PRACTICES, COMMITMENT TO DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN THE
FORTUNE
500/1000
9,
16
(2017),
https://www.diversitybestpractices.com/sites/diversitybestpractices.com/files/attachments/20
17/07/fortune_500_1000_commitment_0.pdf (discussing these Fortune 500 diversity
initiatives).
41 Brake, supra note 5, at 128.
42 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
43 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
44 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (outlining the elements of the affirmative defense); Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 765 (same).
45 Grossman, supra note 39, at 3 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764).
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Faragher and Ellerth both considered the liability of an employer
for a supervisor’s acts of sexual harassment and the creation of a
hostile work environment.46 Faragher involved a lifeguard working
for the city of Boca Raton, Florida,47 while the plaintiff in Ellerth
was a salesperson for Burlington Industries in Chicago, Illinois.48
The Court decided both cases on the same day in interrelated
opinions.49 After extensively considering agency principles, the
concept of “scope of employment,” and prior decisions explaining the
bounds of sexual harassment and the role of a supervisory
employee,50 the Court concluded in Faragher and Ellerth that “[a]n
employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.”51
Nevertheless, unwilling to create a form of strict liability for
supervisory harassment, the Court added an exception to this
conclusion, creating an affirmative defense to sexual harassment
liability:
When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to
liability or damages . . . . The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.52

46 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (deciding whether employers can be held liable under Title
VII for sexual harassment by “a supervisory employee”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746–47 (deciding
whether victimized employees can recover against their employers for sexual harassment by
their supervisors).
47 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
48 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
49 See id. at 764 (“[W]e adopt the following holding in this case and in Faragher v. Boca
Raton . . . also decided today.”).
50 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–801.
51 Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
52 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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One can easily see how the first prong of this affirmative defense
gave rise to a greater focus on compliance in the form of personnel
hiring and implementation of policies and procedures. The Court
noted:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an
antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need
for a stated policy suitable to the employment
circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense.53
These decisions created a set of basic incentives for employers to
avoid liability in harassment cases; these incentives generally “fall
into two categories: measures to prevent harassment and measures
to remedy harassment once it occurs.”54 First, before contemplating
the affirmative defense itself, the Court endorsed employers’
vicarious liability with no defense should a supervisor’s harassment
result in “a tangible employment action” against an employee—
including termination, demotion, refusal to promote, and the like.55
This decision, in and of itself, incentivizes employers to spend time,
money, and resources on hiring and promoting ethical supervisors—
and to train those supervisors to understand harassment law and
its requirements.56 Second, the affirmative defense provides an
exception to liability when the employer can demonstrate that it
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior.”57 The prevention component of this
prong of the defense contemplates the creation of policies
prohibiting harassment, the training of management personnel
regarding which behaviors the law prohibits, and the hiring of a
cadre of trained personnel to update and disseminate these

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
Grossman, supra note 39, at 9.
55 See id. (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765).
56 See id. (“Employers who face automatic liability for this kind of supervisory conduct have
the incentive to be more discriminate in hiring supervisors, to train them more effectively,
and to monitor their behavior . . . .”).
57 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
53
54
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policies.58 Third, the affirmative defense’s mandate to “correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior”59 promotes the
importance of procedures to respond to claims of harassment,
trained personnel to investigate and respond to such claims, and an
overall environment that is receptive (or at the very least not
hostile) to such claims.
As a result of the affirmative defense, many employers publish
and regularly update policies on sexual harassment, create
procedures for responding to claims, and train personnel in the
relevant legal and internal requirements.60 In addition, although
the affirmative defense was created in cases involving supervisory
harassment, “lower courts are increasingly using employer policies
to mitigate liability in cases involving coworker sexual harassment
too.”61 Moreover, “the affirmative defense applies to all forms of
harassment covered by discrimination law, not just sexual
harassment,” which heightens the need to establish compliance
programs.62 As Frank Dobbin has explained, personnel specialists—
who once occupied their time negotiating with unions and managing
new hires and benefits—have taken up the mantle of EEO
compliance with remarkable vigor, creating policies, procedures,
and norms to deal with various forms of discrimination.63
58 See Grossman, supra note 39, at 11–12 (stating that while courts “differ on the necessary
elements of a legally sufficient policy,” they generally agree that employers must have a
“sufficiently disseminated” policy on sexual harassment).
59 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
60 Brake, supra note 5, at 131 (“[E]mployer policies for handling discrimination complaints
are now standard fare in the American workplace.”).
61 Id. at 129.
62 Id.
63 See DOBBIN, supra note 38, at 2 (“In response to law professor Catharine MacKinnon’s
campaign to define sexual harassment as job discrimination, [personnel specialists] built
harassment grievance procedures and training programs. In response to new ideas about
cognition and stereotyping from the social sciences, they devised diversity training programs
that would make managers sensitive to their own unconscious biases. Now these privately
concocted remedies are everywhere. Job hunters and judges are suspicious of firms that don’t
have them.”). In addition, the Court’s decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527
U.S. 526 (1999), also created an affirmative defense to punitive damages if the employer can
demonstrate that it acted in good faith by, for example, “‘implementing programs or policies
to prevent discrimination in the workplace’ or other ‘prophylactic’ measures,” thus creating
more incentive to increase compliance departments and personnel. Joseph A. Seiner, Punitive
Damages, Due Process, and Employment Discrimination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 473, 480 (2012)
(quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545); see also Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jeffrey R. Boles, Intent and
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Finally, with respect to avoiding liability, the incentives to create
policies and procedures and to train personnel also emerge from the
regulatory agency that investigates anti-discrimination claims: the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Under Title
VII, all claims must initially be filed with the EEOC, which
investigates the claims, issues “right to sue” letters, and, in some
cases, files claims on behalf of discrimination plaintiffs.64 The EEOC
specifically recommends the creation and implementation of
policies,65 and, as Deborah Brake has noted, “empirical research has
found that the EEOC is significantly less likely to find ‘cause’ for
discrimination in charges filed against employers who have EEO
policies in place than in charges filed against employers who do
not.”66 Both in the courts and before the relevant regulatory
agencies, employers that have created and implemented EEO
policies “achieve better outcomes . . . than those without them.”67
Apart from liability considerations, numerous employers have
begun implementing diversity and inclusion efforts for business
reasons, using many of the same personnel hired to deal with EEO
compliance.68 While some businesses implement diversity efforts to
comply with affirmative action requirements for government
contractors, many corporate executives have, over time, “become

Liability in Employment Discrimination, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 657 (2016) (“An employer can
thus avoid [punitive damages] by adopting antidiscrimination policies, mandating diversity
education and the like . . . .”).
64 What You Can Expect After a Charge Is Filed, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/what-you-can-expect-after-charge-filed (last visited Nov. 14,
2020).
65 Tips for Small Businesses, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (EEOC),
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/tips.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2020)
(“Developing and distributing clear employee policies . . . may: help employees understand
and comply with your rules and expectations; help prevent problems that may result in
discrimination complaints; and limit your liability should a complaint arise.”). The EEOC
provides specific tips on creating general non-discrimination policies, harassment policies,
reasonable accommodation policies, and leave policies. Id.
66 Brake, supra note 5, at 130 (citing C. Elizabeth Hirsh & Sabino Kornrich, The Context of
Discrimination: Workplace Conditions, Institutional Environments, and Sex and Race
Discrimination Charges, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1394, 1424–25 (2008)).
67 Id.
68 See DOBBIN, supra note 38, at 138–43 (describing how personnel experts have
“rebranded” EEO programs to create diversity and inclusion programs).
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cheerleaders for affirmative action” for business reasons.69 The
“business case” for diversity took hold beginning in the 1980s,
leading many firms, both large and small, to institute diversity
training, workplace culture audits, minority-focused networking
and mentoring programs, and diversity task forces.70 These efforts
continue today, requiring significant investments in personnel and
organizational architecture.71
B. EEO COMPLIANCE AND THE CREATION OF VULNERABLE
WHISTLEBLOWERS

The EEO compliance programs described above have asserted
power in their organizations and have grown in size within an
uncertain legal framework. The federal anti-discrimination laws do
not explicitly define discrimination or harassment, and courts
themselves often have wide-ranging, disparate views on what
constitutes unlawful behavior.72 This reality has left the door open

Id. at 138 (“A 1986 survey of Fortune 500 companies found that despite enforcement
cutbacks, nine out of 10 planned no changes to affirmative action programs and the tenth
planned to expand them.”).
70 Id. at 140, 143–54. As the CEO of Allstate put it, “It’s obvious to us that managing
diversity is not just a work force issue: it is a business issue . . . a competitive issue.” Id. at
157 (alteration in original) (quoting Wayne Heiden, CEO of Allstate); see also Rod P. Githens,
Diversity and Incivility: Toward an Action-Oriented Approach, 13 ADVANCES DEVELOPING
HUM. RESOURCES 40, 43 (2011) (“Competitive advantage arguments have become a prevalent
approach to workplace diversity. Typically, these rationales have been based on attempting
(a) to maximize the potential of workers based on the demographic reality that available
workers today are more diverse than in the past, (b) to maximize organizational potential in
a global economy in which a variety of perspectives are needed to succeed, and (c) to maximize
the general and specific ways of thinking and working to encourage more creativity and
innovation.”); id. at 40 (“Workplace diversity issues have become increasingly prominent in
the last 15 years as diversity is recognized as a core competitive strength and is seen as more
than a compliance goal.”).
71 DOBBIN, supra note 38, at 143–54 (discussing the development of corporate diversity
programs).
72 Brake, supra note 5, at 133 (“[T]he law’s open-ended ban on discrimination [leaves] room
for personnel offices and EEO consultants to read their own content into the law.”); see also
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
. . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
69
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to EEO personnel to fill the vacuum and consequently left
whistleblowers largely unprotected by law.73
The approach taken by many corporate EEO compliance
departments to hostile work environment harassment is a prime
example of compliance policies extending beyond legal
requirements. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that not all
inappropriate behavior in the workplace is actionable
discrimination and that “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of
[the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’”74 But the definition of “severe or pervasive” differs
depending on the court hearing the case, the particular facts at
issue, and the context in which the behavior occurred.75 As one
Fourth Circuit judge noted, “A hostile work environment . . .
normally develops through a series of separate acts, which might
not, standing alone, violate Title VII. . . . And whether a hostile work
environment exists in fact can be a bit of a moving target; there is
no ‘mathematically precise test.’”76 For example, some courts
considering single, severe verbal comments would find an unlawful
hostile work environment, while others would require significantly
greater frequency.77 Given the range of interpretations of unlawful
73 See Brake, supra note 5, at 134 (“EEO understandings diverge from judicial
interpretations of the meaning of discrimination, with poor results for employees under
retaliation law.”).
74 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
75 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) (“We have
emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the
circumstances.’ . . . The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”
(citations omitted)).
76 Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 351 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting) (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)).
77 Compare Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A]
reasonable jury could find that Clubb’s two uses of the ‘porch monkey’ epithet—whether
viewed as a single incident or as a pair of discrete instances of harassment—were severe
enough to engender a hostile work environment.”), Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d
1240, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that, although a Caucasian supervisor’s carving
of “porch monkeys” into the aluminum of a ship where the African-American plaintiff worked
“was an isolated act, it was severe”), Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir.
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harassment and discrimination by courts, the illegality of particular
behavior may depend on the state in which a company resides, the
federal circuit that governs the particular geographic area, or even
which judge hears the case.78 In this context, the behavior that
employee handbooks and EEO policies choose to prohibit may or
may not have any relationship to applicable law.79
In addition, while EEO compliance programs have always been
concerned with avoiding lawsuits, employee handbooks and
workplace policies have begun to cover a wide range of behaviors
and promote policies and procedures far beyond those required by
law.80 For example, many workplaces now maintain policies on

2013) (per curiam) (acknowledging that, where a supervisor “used a deeply offensive racial
epithet [the N-word] when yelling at Ayissi-Etoh to get out of the office,” that “single incident
might well have been sufficient to establish a hostile work environment”), and Seawright v.
Ga. Dep’t of Transp., No. 1:08-CV-0017-CC-CCH, 2009 WL 10668974, at *10 (N.D. Ga. July
7, 2009) (finding “severe or pervasive” conduct based on one “unwanted physical touching of
a private body part, as well as a sexually explicit, offensive comment directed at the plaintiff”),
with Kelly v. Senior Ctrs., Inc., 169 F. App’x 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that use of the
N-word and “token black,” coupled with three racist jokes did not create a hostile work
environment), Mosley v. Marion Cty., 111 F. App’x 726, 728 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(holding that evidence of three incidents involving racial slurs was insufficient to support a
hostile work environment claim), Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535,
552 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the use of the N-word on one occasion by a Caucasian
coworker was insufficient to demonstrate “severe or pervasive” action creating a hostile work
environment), Sanders v. Vill. of Dixmoor, 178 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
use of the N-word on one occasion during an altercation was not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create an objectively hostile work environment), and Wilson v. Kautex, Inc., No.
1:07-CV-60-TS, 2009 WL 1657463, at *25 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2009) (“[T]he single sexually
suggestive remark, if it was made, is not severe or pervasive enough to have created a hostile
work environment.”).
78 See cases cited supra note 77.
79 Brake, supra note 5, at 143–44 (“For example, harassment policies often incorporate the
definition from the 1980 EEOC guidelines: [‘]Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.[’] This language encompasses a much broader category of conduct than what a
court would necessarily find to be actionable.” (footnote omitted)).
80 See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra note 38, at 197–201 (describing the use of “grievance procedures”
for sexual harassment claims before the courts endorsed the approach); Vicki Schultz, The
Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2090 (2003) (“A huge (and growing) literature
warns companies that they should go beyond the dictates of the law to curtail broad forms of
sexual conduct—including conduct that does not satisfy the legal definition of sexual
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diversity sensitivity training, implicit bias, inappropriate language,
dress in the workplace, intra-office romantic relationships, and
broad statements of commitment to fairness and collegiality—all of
which go far beyond the bounds of the law.81
These all-encompassing EEO policies impact the culture of the
workplace, the ways in which employers and employees behave,
and—most importantly for our purposes here—workers’ and
managers’ perceptions of antidiscrimination laws’ protections.82
Most employees do not review caselaw or the changing
interpretations of federal anti-discrimination laws.83 Most workers
(including managers) do not have any real knowledge of federal
anti-discrimination statutes or how courts interpret those
provisions.84 They do, however, have easy access to employee
handbooks and other company policies and are often required to
sign forms affirming their receipt of such policies and agreeing to
adhere to them.85 As Brake stresses, “Internal policies and training
harassment and that does not necessarily undermine gender equality on the job—in order to
avoid liability for sexual harassment.”).
81 See Brake, supra note 5, at 118 (“Employer EEO policies, however, go far beyond
legalistic definitions of discrimination to reach a much broader range of practices.
Encompassing sexual harassment, racial harassment, diversity management, affirmative
action efforts, and broad promises of respect, fairness, and collegiality, employer policies far
exceed the minimum of what discrimination law requires.”); see also Schultz, supra note 80,
at 2093–94 (“First, in the name of preventing sexual harassment, many companies are
adopting broad prohibitions on sexual conduct that does not rise to the level of actionable
harassment under Title VII . . . . Second, companies are enforcing these policies by
disciplining and firing employees who violate them . . . . Third, some companies are banning,
discouraging, or otherwise moving to control sexual relationships between their employees—
even when those relationships are consensual . . . . Crucially, companies are taking these
steps to prohibit sexual conduct without examining whether that conduct undermines gender
equality . . . .”).
82 See Brake, supra note 5, at 133 (“[E]mployer policies have had a marked effect on the
culture of the workplace, including on how employees perceive equal opportunity and what it
means to discriminate.”).
83 Cf. Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing: Constitutionality and
Effectiveness, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 490 (2016) (mentioning “workers’ lack of legal knowledge”
concerning labor laws).
84 See id. at 489 (“[W]orkers lack accurate information about their rights on the job.
Workers here are like used car buyers, and their legal ignorance about their workplace rights
can cause them to strike bad employment deals where they accept sublegal wages or tolerate
unlawful working conditions.”).
85 With the proliferation of mandatory arbitration clauses in employee handbooks and
courts’ requirements for their enforcement, employers have more diligently sought after
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programs now likely play a bigger role in setting norms and
behavior in the everyday workplace than the external law. . . . [B]y
‘operationalizing’ antidiscrimination law, human resources staff
and other EEO compliance personnel have greatly influenced how
people understand workplace discrimination.”86 As a result, a
significant mismatch exists between what the law requires and
what employees believe is unlawful. This is particularly true when
those employees report conduct under EEO policies, as will be
discussed below.87
The often dramatic disconnect between substantive legal
requirements, employee handbooks, and EEO policies is partly
responsible for creating a vulnerable class of discrimination and
harassment whistleblowers.88 This disconnect, in conjunction with
two court-created doctrines interpreting provisions of the antidiscrimination laws, creates the problem.89 The “Objectively
Reasonable Belief” and “Notice Requirement” doctrines impact
retaliation protections for those who report discriminatory behavior
in the workplace and leave many employees who come forward
without legal protection against retaliation.90
The “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine—endorsed in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark County School District
v. Breeden—dictates that for retaliatory conduct to be unlawful, the
complaining party must have an objectively reasonable belief that
the practices he or she opposed (which, in turn, gave rise to the
employee signatures to affirm receipt and acceptance of the handbook and its policies. See
Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of Employment
Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 120 (2010) (noting that employees have been discharged
for refusal to sign employee handbooks).
86 Brake, supra note 5, at 134 (quoting DOBBIN, supra note 38, at 4–6).
87 Cf. Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2012) (describing findings in psychology
research showing that “even when there is substantial evidence of traditional invidious
discriminatory intent (including so-called direct evidence) most people will decline to make
attributions to discrimination”).
88 See Brake, supra note 5, at 116 (“[R]etaliation law has failed to come to terms with the
EEO workplace, leaving employees vulnerable if they raise discrimination complaints
through these processes.”).
89 See id. at 118 (stating that these “[t]wo doctrines in particular pose problems for
employees who use their employer's EEO policies to complain internally”).
90 See id. at 118–120 (explaining the clash between these two doctrines with the role of
employer policies in shaping discrimination protections for employees).
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retaliation) were unlawful.91 When deciding whether that belief was
“objectively reasonable,” the court does not consider the “good faith”
of the whistleblower but rather looks to how a court would view the
reported behavior and whether a court would consider those
behaviors to be unlawful discrimination.92 The doctrine has been
adopted by every circuit in the country.93
Imagine, for example, the following scenario: Wendy, a long-term
employee, approaches her HR representative to complain about a
sexist comment made by her supervisor in the workplace. The
representative agrees that the comment is unacceptable—in fact, it
violates company policy prohibiting insensitive comments in the
workplace. The HR representative promises to investigate and
follows up by approaching the supervisor and others to ask about
the incident. The supervisor claims that Wendy is mistaken about
the comment but promises to follow up with her to “make sure they
are okay.” This meeting goes poorly, ending in even greater tension
between the supervisor and Wendy. Three weeks later, when upper
management begins to pressure the supervisor to cut costs, the
supervisor takes the opportunity to terminate Wendy, who he now
feels uncomfortable supervising. He consults with HR and feels
comfortable proceeding with the termination because he
understands that it is highly unlikely that any court will uphold a
retaliation claim under these circumstances.94
Under the “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine, Wendy likely
would find her complaint to HR unprotected and her termination
lawful. Under existing case law, one biased comment likely “does

532 U.S. 268, 270–71 (2001) (per curiam) (describing the doctrine).
Id.; see also Satterwhite v. City of Houston, 602 F. App’x 585, 588 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the employee-plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that his supervisor’s comment
created a hostile environment and that he could not have reasonably believed that his
supervisor’s actions were prohibited by Title VII). But see Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting
“Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
1469, 1473 (2007) (arguing for protection “unless the defendant could establish that the
plaintiff was acting in bad faith at the time she made the complaint”).
93 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the
Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s AntiRetaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7 (2007) (“[S]ince Breeden, courts within
all United States circuits have adopted the objectively reasonable standard.”).
94 See Leora Eisenstadt & Deanna Geddes, Suppressed Anger, Retaliation Doctrine, and
Workplace Culture, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 147, 150–51 (2018) (discussing a similar hypothetical).
91
92

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

23

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4

170

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:147

not create an unlawful hostile work environment,”95 so Wendy
cannot reasonably think that the supervisor’s comment constituted
unlawful discrimination that would necessitate retaliation
protection.96 This is so even if Wendy’s employee handbook or the
company’s EEO policy specifically prohibits racist, sexist,
discriminatory, or otherwise insensitive comments in the workplace
and communicates a “zero tolerance” policy for such comments.97
The Breeden Court established judicial understandings of
discrimination as the standard for determining an “objectively
reasonable” complaint, rather than the company’s applicable
policy.98 Moreover, Wendy’s complaint is unprotected (meaning her
termination is lawful) even if that same EEO policy specifically
encourages—or even requires—employees who observe or
experience prohibited conduct to come forward and assures those
employees that they will not face retaliation for doing so.99
Regardless of the company’s policy itself, when an employee comes
forward to report prohibited conduct, she may find herself
unprotected by the laws to which the company policy refers.100 If the
Id. at 152 (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271).
Id. (citing Satterwhite, 602 F. App’x at 588).
97 See Brake, supra note 5, at 118 (“[T]he lower courts have developed a body of law that
creates stark dilemmas for employees who use employers’ internal channels for complaining
about discrimination—that is, employees who follow the employer’s rules and norms for
trying to resolve problems internally first.”).
98 Id. at 116 (“[T]he EEO workplace is barely visible in the world that the Supreme Court
has conjured when it has addressed claims alleging retaliation for challenging
discrimination . . . retaliation law has failed to come to terms with the EEO workplace, leaving
employees vulnerable if they raise discrimination complaints through these processes.”).
99 See Michele M. Hoyman & Jamie R. McCall, Sexual Harassment, in HANDBOOK OF
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT 487 (Stephen E. Condrey ed., 3d ed. 2010)
(encouraging provisions in EEO policies that recommend or require employees to report
harassing behaviors without regard to their severity or pervasiveness, noting that “because
fear or shame has probably led to a significant underreporting of various forms of sexual
harassment, training sessions should encourage victims to come forward when genuine
problems exist”).
100 See, e.g., Hill v. Guyoungtech USA, Inc., No. 07-0750-KD-M, 2008 WL 4073638, at *9
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 2008) (rejecting the plaintiff’s retaliation claim because she could not have
had an “objectively reasonable belief” that the behavior about which she complained was
unlawful). In Hill, the court acknowledged:
95
96

[The plaintiff] was required to attend an employee orientation before she began
work and she received the Employee Handbook . . . . At the time she received the
handbook, [the plaintiff] understood that there was a policy against harassment
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conduct she is reporting is prohibited by company policy but would
not—in the eyes of the courts in her jurisdiction—be viewed as
unlawful discrimination, the whistleblower is not protected against
retaliation by the employer and may legally be confronted with
informal denial of opportunities, “icing out” by supervisors and coworkers, demotion in responsibilities or pay, and even
termination.101
While the “Objectively Reasonable Belief” doctrine is largely the
cause of this vulnerable EEO whistleblower problem, a second
doctrine—known as the “Notice Requirement”—shares some blame.
This doctrine requires “that employee opposition to discrimination
be expressed in terms that are clear and specific enough to put the
employer on notice that the complaint is about discrimination in
particular and not more generalized concerns about workplace
fairness.”102 Under the “Notice Requirement,” an internal complaint
that does not specifically allege discriminatory conduct may not be
protected against retaliation. For example, an oft-cited Third
Circuit case rejected a retaliation claim based on a letter to HR in
which the plaintiff complained about being passed over for a
promotion after many years of service.103 The plaintiff’s letter
complained: “In view of my 21 years of experience in this field . . . I
am quite puzzled as to why the position was awarded to a less
qualified individual.”104 After he was terminated a short time after
and understood she was required to contact Human Resources if she felt she was
being harassed. The parties do not dispute that [the plaintiff] followed company
procedures when she reported [the] conduct . . . .
Id. at *4. This acknowledgment that the plaintiff was following company policy by reporting
the conduct had no impact on the court’s decision that plaintiff lacked an “objectively
reasonable belief” and thus that her termination was lawful. Id. at *9.
101 See, e.g., Van Portfliet v. H&R Block Mortg. Corp., No. 8:05-CV-1474-T-TGW, 2007 WL
2773995, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2007), aff’d per curiam, 290 F. App’x 301 (11th Cir. 2008)
(acknowledging that the plaintiff reported harassment to HR but that did not impact the
conclusion that no retaliation occurred because of a lack of “an objectively reasonable belief”
that the underlying conduct was unlawful); see also Brake, supra note 5, at 142 & n.164
(providing a lengthy list of cases in which the courts apply the “objectively reasonable belief”
doctrine to retaliation based on reports of “isolated or sporadic offensive comments” and
noting that “[i]n none of these cases do the courts consider how the plaintiffs’ beliefs are
influenced by employer policies on harassment”).
102 Brake, supra note 5, at 157.
103 See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 696–97 (3d Cir. 1995).
104 Id. at 697.
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lodging this complaint, the plaintiff filed a suit claiming, among
other things, that he was the victim of age discrimination under the
ADEA, and he included a retaliation claim alleging that his position
was eliminated in response to his letter to HR.105 The Third Circuit
concluded, in regards to the retaliation claim, that:
[Plaintiff’s] letter to Human Resources complains about
unfair treatment in general and expresses his
dissatisfaction with the fact that someone else was
awarded the position, but it does not specifically
complain about age discrimination. Accordingly, the
letter does not constitute the requisite “protected
conduct” for a prima facie case of retaliation.106
The employee used the proper channels to complain. He phrased his
complaint in terms of unfairness and specifically referenced his
years of service and experience.107 Nonetheless, because he did not
explicitly highlight the age difference between himself and the
person who was chosen to fill the position, he did not provide the
employer with sufficient notice that he was, in fact, complaining
about age discrimination. As a result, his actions were not protected
conduct that would afford him retaliation protection.108
The “Notice Requirement” makes some sense, as Deborah Brake
acknowledges, since management must be able to identify a
complaint as being related to discrimination and not merely a
general complaint about company policy or practices in order to
frame its response and refrain from unlawful retaliation.109
However, given the way in which EEO policies are presented, “[t]he
problem is that, as some courts have applied it, the requirement of
employer knowledge demands a more precise terminology than
employees use when they follow employer policies to voice their
concerns about discrimination.”110
Id. at 698–702 (discussing plaintiff’s age discrimination and retaliation claims).
Id. at 701–02.
107 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108 Barber, 68 F.3d at 702 (“[The plaintiff’s] letter is just too vague to support a finding that
his job was eliminated because he engaged in behavior that was protected under the ADEA.”).
109 Brake, supra note 5, at 157 (noting that “[e]mployers must be able to comprehend the
nature of the complaint”).
110 Id. at 157–58.
105
106
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As described above, EEO policies tend to be broad, allencompassing approaches to creating healthy workplace cultures.
They ban unlawful conduct alongside merely inappropriate
behavior, and they “often address equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination in broad terms of professionalism, respect, and
fairness.”111 Employees may in turn be tempted to follow that lead
and convey their complaints about unequal treatment or
harassment as concerns about fairness or inappropriate conduct,
thinking they are complaining about conduct that the employer’s
policies specifically prohibit. This gap between employee
expectations based on EEO policies and the realities of retaliation
protection under federal anti-discrimination laws again leaves
complaining employees without legal recourse. While the decision to
adopt broad EEO policies on its face appears to be a pro-employee
approach, it ends up creating vulnerable whistleblowers.

III. BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON SECURITIES FRAUD
The securities law industry is another area in which employees
are vulnerable to retaliation even though the requirements of their
companies’ internal compliance policies and programs exceed the
protections of the federal securities laws. This dilemma exists
largely because two of the most notable securities-related
whistleblower programs effectively limit the universe of protected
persons to those reporting violations of either the enumerated
federal securities laws or the rules and regulations squarely within
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
A. THE RISE OF THE ANTI-FRAUD & SECURITIES REGULATION
COMPLIANCE INDUSTRY

The passage of SOX and Dodd–Frank greatly facilitated the rise
of the compliance industry in anti-fraud and securities regulation.
Each statute created an expansive regime of binding regulations for
organizations falling under the SEC’s governance.112 It is commonly
believed that one of the first facilitators of the compliance industry

111
112

Id. at 158.
See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text.
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was the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 1991 amendments to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which implemented the
“Organizational Sentencing Guidelines” to create reduced penalties
for organizations that adopted effective compliance programs and to
impose punishment-like probation for organizations with no such
program in place.113 The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
include several considerations for courts in determining whether a
compliance program is effective, including whether the program
contains high-level oversight, communication of a program’s
procedures to all employees, disciplinary actions for violations, and
the use of monitoring, auditing, and reporting systems.114
Since 1991, the compliance industry in the field of securities
regulation and anti-fraud has continued to grow dramatically.115 In
the early 2000s, the demise of major corporations like Enron and
WorldCom—and the various accounting and financial scandals that
accompanied such corporate failures—led Congress to enact SOX in
2002.116 SOX focuses heavily on internal controls, requiring that
“companies and their gatekeepers”—including attorneys and
accountants—“establish and maintain an adequate system of
internal controls and procedures for financial reporting.”117 In light
113 See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C.
L. REV. 21, 45 (2018) (discussing how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines prompted companies
to focus on and invest in compliance initiatives); David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and
Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the
Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 318 (2016) (noting that the 1991 inclusion of
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “ushered in
a new era for corporate compliance programs” by “offer[ing] corporations an opportunity for a
reduced sentence if they are convicted of a federal crime”).
114 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012)
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (listing characteristics of an effective compliance
and ethics program); id. § 8C2.5(f)(1) (decreasing culpability in sentencing if the criminal
offense occurred at a time when the organization had an effective compliance and ethics
program in place).
115 See Hess, supra note 113, at 318 (discussing the vast developments in compliance since
1991).
116 Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L. REV. 855,
901 n.275 (2014) (recounting the statement of one legislator that SOX, as legislation, “would
have lost momentum without WorldCom and the other scandals that followed Enron”
(quoting Spencer S. Hsu & Kathleen Day, Senate Vote Spotlights Audit Reform and Sarbanes,
WASH. POST, July 15, 2002, at A1)).
117 Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope
of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 438 (2009).
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of these developments, the post-SOX era helped pave the way for a
shift from more traditional, government-dictated regulatory models
to “new governance” models defined by internal reporting, selfreporting to government, and heightened self-regulation.118 In this
way, corporate tides began turning in favor of widespread,
preventative practices aimed at avoiding fraud and securities
violations in the first instance, rather than reacting after the
problem has already occurred.119 This prospective approach
naturally led to enhanced collaboration among the government and
the governed entities.120 These developments also contributed to a
greater emphasis on internal reporting, thereby positioning internal
whistleblowers to “become part of the corporate monitoring system”
by “provid[ing] a visible mechanism for employee reports to reach
the ears of those who can remedy the misconduct.”121
Following the SOX era, the Great Recession spurred the passage
of Dodd–Frank.122 It was a massive regulatory undertaking aimed
at promoting national financial stability by improving transparency
and accountability in the financial system.123 In addition to the
introduction of widespread financial regulatory reforms, Dodd–
Frank’s strong whistleblower protection program created a new
reward program to incentivize whistleblowers to come forward with
valuable information about fraud and securities violations.124
Pursuant to Dodd–Frank’s bounty program, the SEC will award
voluntary whistleblowers a bounty of between ten and thirty
percent of the total monetary sanctions imposed for “original
118 See Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for AttorneyWhistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 491, 498–99 (2016)
(discussing the post-SOX shift to “new governance” models).
119 See id. at 499 (discussing the shift from post hoc, adversarial enforcement to a focus on
“ensuring compliance with the law” beforehand).
120 See id. (“[N]ew governance is built on . . . administrative governance in which various
stakeholders, both private and public, collaborate to implement and ensure effective
compliance with the law . . . .”).
121 Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Structural Model To Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1132.
122 See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
123 See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2018)).
124 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2018) (stating that the government will “pay an award . . . to
[one] or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the [SEC] that
led to [a] successful enforcement . . . action”).
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information” that leads to a “successful enforcement” action.125 The
structure of this program incentivizes internal reporting through
effective compliance programs, as the SEC has heavily encouraged
whistleblowers to first report violations through internal
compliance channels, which the agency will favorably consider when
calculating the bounty the whistleblower will receive.126 Dodd–
Frank’s bounty program has been very successful, resulting in the
SEC awarding approximately $387 million to sixty-seven
whistleblowers from the inception of the program in 2011 to the end
of the 2019 fiscal year.127
These developments have greatly facilitated the vast growth of
the securities and anti-fraud compliance industry. While
“compliance” in the pre-SOX era largely focused on ethics and was
managed by HR departments with minimal visibility, SOX’s
preventative regulations and requirements—as enforced by the
SEC—increased the importance of corporate compliance officers.128
These developments essentially “forced” companies to hire actual
compliance officers who could avoid or properly respond to violations
by creating a position with enhanced resources, greater power, and
increased access to chief executive officers and corporate boards.129
Additionally, the SEC has required corporations that commit
violations to develop stand-alone compliance departments with a
designated chief compliance officer, resulting in a considerable

Id. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)–(B) (outlining the possible range of awards).
See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,301
(June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (stating that the SEC has “further
incentivize[d] whistleblowers to utilize their companies’ internal compliance and reporting
systems”).
127 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 9 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2019-annual-report-whistleblower-program.
pdf (providing statistics on SEC awards to whistleblowers under the program).
128 See Susan Lorde Martin, Compliance Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, More
Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 169, 178 (2015) (detailing the shift in
compliance efforts and growing importance of compliance officers post-SOX).
129 Id. (“After SOX, forced by the SEC to hire compliance officers in response to violations,
companies were more likely to hire high-profile people with more power and access to CEOs
and corporate boards.”).
125
126
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trend of compliance departments that do not overlap with other
departments of the entity.130
As a result, the compliance industry in this sector has boomed
and financial institutions have spent heavily on compliance
initiatives in the decade since the Great Recession, creating
compliance personnel and officers who now enjoy enhanced prestige,
who extensively collaborate with other departments, and who have
the opportunity to provide insight on the entity’s strategic
decisions.131 Along with the independent compliance department,
the most common anti-fraud controls that have strengthened the
compliance industry include the external audit of financial
statements, the adoption of codes of conduct, and internal audit
departments.132 As of 2017, at least ninety-four percent of
organizations had directly included compliance requirements in
their internal policies and procedures that were accessible to all
employees.133
While statutes like SOX and Dodd–Frank have contributed to the
steady rise of the compliance industry in the anti-fraud and
securities context, these laws and their judicial interpretations have
simultaneously limited which employees are eligible for retaliation

130 See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 74–75 (2014) (explaining the rise of
compliance departments that are separate from the legal department).
131 See Miller, supra note 2, at 437–38 (explaining the growing influence of the compliance
field and the increase in prestige and power of compliance officers within organizations); see
also Steve Culp, Four Major Trends For Compliance Professionals in 2019, FORBES (Apr. 17,
2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveculp/2019/04/17/four-major-trends-forcompliance-professionals-in-2019/#54a29cd367ad (describing how firms are pursuing lowercost and technology-based compliance functions due to “[h]igh employee costs (and high
attrition rates)” of compliance personnel).
132 See generally ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE (2016), https://www.acfe.com/rttn2016/docs/2016-reportto-the-nations.pdf (analyzing 2410 cases of occupational fraud investigated between January
2014 and October 2015 to assess total and average losses, common types of fraud, fraud
detection methods, and fraud risks).
133 NICOLE STRYKER, KPMG, THE COMPLIANCE JOURNEY: BOOSTING THE VALUE OF
COMPLIANCE
IN
A
CHANGING
REGULATORY
CLIMATE
3
(2017),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pa/pdf/compliancejourney-survey-2017.pdf (finding
that compliance policies are almost universal in major organizations surveyed).
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protection.134 Given that SOX and Dodd–Frank are securitiesfocused, the vast number of organizational compliance programs
that impose reporting requirements on employees extending beyond
the anti-fraud and securities realm effectively exclude such
employees from the protections of SOX and Dodd–Frank.135
B. WHISTLEBLOWER IMPACT OF ANTI-FRAUD & SECURITIES
REGULATION COMPLIANCE POLICIES

To illustrate the problem of inconsistent protections for
whistleblowers, it is helpful to examine the internal compliance
programs of a handful of notable Fortune 500 public companies.
These programs prescribe behavior on an internal level that is
neither mandated nor protected by law. For example, Facebook’s
Code of Conduct, which broadly applies to all Facebook personnel—
including directors, officers, and employees, as well as agency
workers, contractors, consultants, “and others working on
Facebook’s behalf”—mandates internal reporting to specified
individuals if personnel “learn about or suspect a violation” of the
Code of Conduct, any other Facebook policy, or any law.136 Failure
to report according to this code “may result in disciplinary action for
employees and termination of employment/[one’s] relationship with
Facebook.”137 Although Facebook’s Code of Conduct does nominally
prohibit retaliation for good faith reporting of potential violations,
the Code does not elaborate on how Facebook would enforce such
protections, how an employee may seek redress, or what remedies
are provided.138
While Facebook’s anti-retaliation policy, like that of most other
companies, is not limited to reporting violations of only the federal
134 See Pacella, supra note 118, at 505 (noting that “case law has been divided on the
question of whether internal whistleblowers are guaranteed retaliation protections under
Dodd–Frank”).
135 See id.; Dig. Realty Tr. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777–78 (2018) (holding that the antiretaliation provision of Dodd–Frank does not extend employees who report violations
internally but who do not report directly to the SEC).
136
Code
of
Conduct,
FACEBOOK
paras.
1,
11
(June
10,
2019),
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_downloads/governance_documents/2019/Code-ofConduct-(June-10-2019).pdf.
137 Id. para. 11.
138 Id. para. 12.
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securities laws, one further limitation under SOX and Dodd–Frank
that withholds protection from whistleblowers is that both statutes
require an employment relationship between the employeewhistleblower and the employer-retaliator.139 Both SOX and Dodd–
Frank explicitly state that retaliation against an employeewhistleblower “in the terms and conditions of employment” is
unlawful, and subsequent regulations and case law interpreting the
two statutes have adhered to the plain statutory language by
requiring a formal employment relationship for whistleblower
protection eligibility.140 In contrast, Facebook’s anti-retaliation
policy extends to individuals outside of an official employment
relationship, given its broad applicability to consultants,
contractors, and others generally “working on Facebook’s behalf.”141
Therefore, anyone working with Facebook who is not an employee,
but who nonetheless must adhere to the Code of Conduct, will have
no legal recourse if retaliated against for whistleblowing.142
Similarly, Apple Inc.’s “Business Conduct Policy” is binding not
only on all employees—including senior management and the board
of directors—but also on all “independent contractors, consultants,
and others who do business with Apple,”143 thereby extending
beyond the traditional employment requirement of SOX and Dodd–
Frank. This policy requires all of these individuals to report
internally any violations of the company’s policies or legal or
regulatory requirements; the “[f]ailure to do so may result in
disciplinary action.”144 Apple also includes a blanket non-retaliation
provision to protect individuals adhering to its policy, but the policy
See Eisenstadt & Pacella, supra note 33, at 675 (describing how SOX and Dodd–Frank
require “a formal employment relationship for retaliation protection eligibility”).
140 See id. at 675–86 (explaining how both SOX and Dodd–Frank protections require a
formal employment relationship and how courts and policymakers have strictly interpreted
this language); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2018) (detailing the civil protections under SOX
for whistleblowers against employer retaliation); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2018) (providing that,
under Dodd–Frank, no employer may discriminate against an employee-whistleblower, and
any whistleblower alleging retaliation may seek judicial relief).
141 See Code of Conduct, supra note 136, para. 1 (stating that Facebook’s internal code
applies outside of the traditional employer–employee relationship and promises protection
against retaliation for whistleblowing).
142 See supra notes 135, 139–141 and accompanying text.
143 Business Conduct: The Way We Do Business Worldwide, APPLE 2 (Oct. 2015),
https://s2.q4cdn.com/470004039/files/doc_downloads/gov_docs/business_conduct_policy.pdf.
144 Id. at 15.
139
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does not elaborate on how employees may enforce their rights
thereunder or what remedies may be available to them.145 Like
Facebook’s policy, the universe of potential whistleblower
disclosures pursuant to Apple’s policy far exceeds what would be
eligible for protection under either SOX or Dodd–Frank.
Amazon’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics contains a brief
section pertaining to employee reporting.146 Unlike the policies of
Facebook and Apple, which require internal reporting, Amazon’s
policy does not make this mandatory; the company’s legal
department has internal guidelines for “employees who wish to
report violations of the Code of Conduct.”147 The policy then states
that the company “will not allow retaliation against an employee for
reporting misconduct by others in good faith.”148 But, like the other
companies discussed, it does not specify how such a policy would be
enforced.149 If an employee opts to make an internal report, the
policy then requires that they “cooperate in internal investigations
of potential or alleged misconduct.”150 This provision is potentially
problematic in that it discourages employees from reporting (when
doing so is already optional) because it fails to ensure the
whistleblower’s anonymity or confidentiality. This gap in protection
creates vulnerability to subsequent retaliation that may result from
the employee’s involvement in investigations that the company
undertakes after receiving the report. As is visible from these
examples, internal reporting—a component so fundamental to any
effective code of ethics, compliance program, or internal policy—is
neither required nor universally protected under the law.
In addition to its bounty program, Dodd–Frank created
significant retaliation protections for whistleblowers by providing

145 See id. (“Apple will not retaliate—and will not tolerate retaliation—against any
individual for reporting a concern in good-faith with the Business Conduct Helpline.”).
146 Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, AMAZON, https://ir.aboutamazon.com/corporategovernance/documents-charters/code-business-conduct-and-ethics (last visited Nov. 14,
2020).
147 Id. (emphasis added).
148 Id.
149 See id.
150 Id.
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them a judicial remedy in federal court against their retaliator(s).151
Whistleblowers who experience retaliation are eligible to sue
directly in federal court within a six-year statute of limitations after
the date that the retaliation allegedly occurred.152 Under this
program, whistleblowers are protected from retaliation when they
(1) provide information to the SEC; (2) testify or assist in SEC
investigations or related actions; or (3) “mak[e] disclosures that are
required or protected under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 . . . ,
[the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)
(retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant)], [or] any other
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].”153
None of these three categories of protected activity include any
type of whistleblower disclosure that falls within a company code of
conduct, compliance program, or internal reporting policy. Such
internal policies are beyond the scope of any of the federal laws
specifically mentioned or any SEC rule or regulation. The “securities
laws” are defined explicitly as the following: the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
of 2002, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company
Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970.154 Unless an internal policy requires
reporting only possible violations of these specific laws or other laws
falling within the SEC’s jurisdiction, the protections of Dodd–Frank
do not apply.
Case law interpreting Dodd–Frank clearly states that eligibility
for retaliation protections under the statute must arise from the
whistleblower having reported on an issue that directly pertains to
possible violations of the securities laws.155 One notable case
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (“An individual who alleges discharge or other
discrimination in violation of [this Act] may bring an action under this subsection in the
appropriate [U.S.] district court . . . for the relief provided . . . .”).
152 See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B).
153 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (2018) (emphasis added).
154 15 U.S.C § 78c(a)(47) (2018).
155 See, e.g., Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778, 781 (2018) (noting that
employees who report information “bearing no relationship whatever to the securities laws”
are “ineligible to seek relief under § 78u–6(h)”); Zillges v. Kenney Bank & Tr., 24 F. Supp. 3d
795, 801 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (deeming a whistleblower ineligible to make a claim under Dodd–
Frank because he “ha[d] not alleged or shown that his disclosure relate[d] to a violation of
federal securities laws”); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 997–98
151
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interpreting the Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions involved a
whistleblower who internally reported his CEO’s suspected
violations of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
rules, an act that the whistleblower believed would constitute a
protected disclosure subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.156 The court
rejected the whistleblower’s retaliation claim under Dodd–Frank by
narrowly interpreting the statute and honing in on the language
protecting “disclosures that are required or protected” under the
laws specified above.157 Because the FINRA rules contained only a
general obligation to adhere to an honor code, rather than an
identifiable duty to disclose, the court denied retaliation protections
to the whistleblower, holding that “[m]erely alleging the violation of
a law or rule under the SEC’s purview is not enough; a plaintiff must
allege that a law or rule in the SEC’s jurisdiction explicitly requires
or protects disclosure of that violation.”158 Thus, a suspected
violation of a specific SEC rule is insufficient; the pertinent SEC
rule must mandate reporting.159 Although this interpretation is
even narrower than a plain reading of the statute as it limits the
types of protected disclosures under Dodd–Frank, subsequent cases
interpreting the statute’s protections have followed the same
reasoning.160 In light of this established precedent, employees who
are retaliated against for adhering to an internal compliance
program or policy simply have no opportunity to seek redress under
Dodd–Frank.
(M.D. Tenn. 2012) (rejecting Dodd–Frank protections for a whistleblower who reported
violations of the FCPA because it is “not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC”).
156 See Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
157 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii)).
158 Id.
159 Id. (“The Dodd–Frank Act protects whistleblowers who fulfill an existing duty to
disclose, but it does not protect those who report violations of SEC laws or regulations that
do not impose such a duty. Here, the FINRA rules cited by Plaintiff do not impose a duty to
disclose.”).
160 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, Civil Action No. 4:12-345, 2012 WL 2522599, at
*6 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2012), aff’d, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on Egan to hold that
only whistleblower protections that are “required or protected” by the laws specified in Dodd–
Frank are eligible for retaliation protections (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)); Nollner,
852 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (stating that the “anti-retaliation provision . . . only protects
disclosures that are ‘required or protected’ by laws, rules, or regulations within the SEC’s
jurisdiction”).
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Digital Realty Trust,
Inc. v. Somers161 also disincentivizes whistleblowers from making
internal reports, which are key components of nearly all compliance
programs and internal policies. In this decision, the Court ruled that
only those who report to the SEC directly—as opposed to
supervisors or internal reporting channels at their workplace—may
seek retaliation protections under Dodd–Frank.162 This decision
resulted from a circuit court split about the perceived tension
between two particular subsections of Dodd–Frank.163 First,
subsection (a)(6) defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who
provides, or [two] or more individuals acting jointly who provide,
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
[SEC], in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
[SEC].”164 Second, subsection (h) prohibits retaliation against “a
whistleblower” who engages in protected activity, which, as noted
above, includes “making disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 . . . and any other law, rule
or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].”165 In light of
this direct reference to disclosures under SOX, which specifically
provides retaliation protection for whistleblowers who report only
internally,166 a reasonable argument exists that Dodd–Frank’s
language is ambiguous. The U.S. Supreme Court did not find the
language ambiguous and instead gave effect to Dodd–Frank’s plain
language, which defines a whistleblower as someone who makes a
138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
See id. at 778 (“Somers did not provide information ‘to the Commission’ before his
termination, § 78u–6(a)(6), so he did not qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ at the time of the alleged
retaliation. He is therefore ineligible to seek relief under § 78u–6(h).”).
163 See id. at 776 (discussing this circuit split). Compare Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623 (holding by
the Fifth Circuit that Dodd–Frank’s “whistleblower-protection provision creates a private
cause of action only for individuals who provide information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the SEC”), with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir.
2015) (finding that the statute’s language was “sufficiently ambiguous” to defer to the SEC’s
interpretation that whistleblowers who report to their employers are “entitled to pursue
Dodd–Frank remedies for alleged retaliation”).
164 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2018).
165 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
166 Under SOX, employees who report to “a person with supervisory authority over the
employee (or such other person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate,
discover, or terminate misconduct)” are protected from retaliation as whistleblowers. 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2018).
161
162
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report directly to the SEC and is retaliated against for that external
report.167
The Digital Realty Trust decision not only confirms that
whistleblowers who are retaliated against for reporting pursuant to
their internal company policies are not protected, but it also
effectively prompts whistleblowers to turn to SOX for retaliation
protection, given that SOX directly protects internal reporting.168
SOX’s whistleblower program, enacted in 2002, provides retaliation
protections for employees of publicly-traded companies who report
information to either “(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement
agency; (B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress;
or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such
other person working for the employer who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct).”169 Under the third
prong, whistleblowers who report internally are eligible for SOX’s
protections. However, SOX’s whistleblower protections are far less
robust than those of Dodd–Frank. Unlike Dodd–Frank’s provision
allowing whistleblowers to sue employers in federal court for
redress,170 SOX provides whistleblowers an administrative remedy
through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA): the aggrieved whistleblower must file a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor within 180 days of the alleged retaliation.171
Also, while SOX protects internal whistleblowers, it applies only
to employees of public companies,172 significantly narrowing the
range of employee-whistleblowers eligible to seek protection for
relying on internal compliance programs. To be eligible for
retaliation protections under SOX, a whistleblower must disclose
information that the whistleblower “reasonably believes constitutes
Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 776–78, 782 (“The statute’s unambiguous whistleblower
definition, in short, precludes the [SEC] from more expansively interpreting that term.”).
168 See supra note 166.
169 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2018) (emphasis added).
170 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (“An individual who alleges discharge or other
discrimination in violation of [this Act] may bring an action under this subsection in the
appropriate [U.S.] district court . . . for the relief provided . . . .”).
171 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)–(c) (2018).
172 Id. §1514A(a) (stating that “[n]o company with a class of securities registered under
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” may retaliate against an
employee-whistleblower).
167
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a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or
regulation of the [SEC], or any provision of Federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders . . . .”173 These enumerated SOX
sections—1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348—are statutory references to
mail fraud, wire fraud, banking fraud, and securities fraud,
respectively.174 While these various types of fraud may appear broad
and arguably capture provisions that may come under an
organization’s general compliance program, most judicial and
administrative decisions interpreting the SOX whistleblower
program have construed this provision narrowly. Such decisions
have commonly held that a whistleblower report of non-compliance
with internal company procedures, even if it may constitute fraud,
“does not carry with it the force of law” as would a statement or
public information that has been made available to the SEC or to
shareholders.175 In sum, an employee may dutifully follow his
company’s compliance code, adhering to suggestions or mandates to
report suspected fraud and, nonetheless, find himself the subject of
lawful retaliation in the form of termination, demotion or other
adverse actions. The broad mandates of compliance codes coupled
with the exceptionally narrow protections for whistleblowers under
federal law create this perverse and surprising situation.

IV. BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON CORRUPTION
The anti-corruption compliance industry joins its EEO and
securities peers in leaving employees vulnerable to potential
retaliation. Internal compliance policies and anti-corruption

Id. § 1514A(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1348 (2018) (discussing statutory elements
of mail, wire, banking, and securities fraud).
175 Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ganino v.
Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir 2000)); see also Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA),
Inc., No. 05 C 5683, 2006 WL 1460032, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2006) (finding the plaintiff’s
claim did not explain how the compliance program at issue violates SOX provisions or other
“SEC regulation[s] related to fraud”); Wengender v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., No. 2005-SOX-59,
2006 WL 3246887, at *11 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 30, 2006) (recommended decision) (holding
SOX protections are applicable only to “fraud against shareholders,” rather than “general
allegations of fraud”); Marshall v. Northrup Gruman Synoptics, No. 2005-SOX-0008, 2005
WL 4889013, at *2 (Dep’t of Labor June 22, 2005) (recommended decision) (holding SOX
protections are only applicable to “fraud against shareholders”).
173
174
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programs often extend beyond the protections that applicable
federal laws provide. This Part demonstrates how this issue of
employee retaliation exposure manifests in the anti-corruption
corporate compliance domain. Shortcomings in compliance efforts
pertaining to the FCPA and domestic commercial bribery laws
expose employees to workplace retaliation without legal recourse.176
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE
INDUSTRY

Mirroring similar developments in the EEO, anti-fraud, and
securities regulation domains, the anti-corruption compliance
industry is flourishing, with growing numbers of in-house
compliance professionals and professional services firms providing
companies with anti-corruption compliance services.177 The recent
expansion of the compliance department within BNP Paribas
exemplifies this growth: in 2014, 1732 employees were in this
department, but the number rose to 3770 just three years later.178 A
specialized online job board for anti-corruption compliance
professionals—which announces jobs to “an engaged audience of
over 120,000 anti-corruption and compliance professionals each
month”—also highlights the industry’s expansion.179
Largely responsible for fueling this growth, the contemporary
anti-corruption enforcement model between government and
corporate entities relies on a combination of internal compliance
programs and whistleblower engagement.180 As centerpieces in
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2018) (codifying the FCPA).
See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 993–
99 (2009) (describing the development of the compliance industry in this area).
178 Sarah Butcher, How Compliance Jobs in Investment Banks Fell Down to Earth,
EFINANCIALCAREERS
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://news.efinancialcareers.com/uken/3000112/compliance-jobs-banking (noting the growth of BNP’s compliance division).
179 About, THE FCPA BLOG: JOB BOARD, https://www.fcpablogjobs.com/pages/3325-about
(last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
180 See Steven R. Salbu, Mitigating the Harshness of FCPA Enforcement Through a
Qualifying Good-Faith Compliance Defense, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 478 (2018) (stating that
“recognition is growing that to eradicate bribery, cooperation between corporations and the
government is vital”); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CORRUPTION: A
GLOSSARY
OF
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS
IN
CRIMINAL
LAW
22
(2008),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/41194428.pdf (defining corruption as the “abuse of
public or private office for personal gain”).
176
177
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compliance programs, anti-corruption policies and reporting
procedures capture a company’s express commitment to conduct
business legally and ethically and to hold accountable those who
violate its policies.181 In its “Model Anti-Corruption Policy,”
CREATe Compliance Inc., an Ethisphere Institute subsidiary,
summarizes prevalent advice for companies drafting such polices:
“Each company should create an anti-corruption policy which is
appropriate to its size, organization, complexity, risk profile and
business relationships, and which is compliant with local laws and
laws with international reach.”182
Anti-corruption policies typically convey a zero-tolerance
approach to bribery and other forms of corruption in connection with
any company-related activity,183 and companies often encourage
employees to raise suspected violations of these policies.184 With an
all-encompassing scope, anti-corruption policies may prohibit more
conduct than the law prohibits. Alongside such expansive policies,
company guarantees of non-retaliation are typically not enforceable
under the law.185 Thus, an employee who observes what appears to
be corrupt conduct in the workplace and reports such conduct in
good faith, following the procedures outlined in the respective
181 See Jon Jordan, The Need for a Comprehensive International Foreign Bribery
Compliance Program, Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Bribery Environment,
117 PENN ST. L. REV. 89, 113–21 (2012) (discussing effective compliance procedures in an
international anti-bribery context).
182 Model Anti-Corruption Policy, CREATE COMPLIANCE INC., https://ethisphere.com/wpcontent/uploads/Model-Policies-7.2.18.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2020). The Ethisphere
Institute is a for-profit company that “brings together leading global companies to define and
codify best practices for ethics and compliance, and helps to advance business performance
through data-driven assessments, benchmarking, and guidance.” ETHISPHERE,
https://ethisphere.com/old-home/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
183 See Bethany Hengsbach, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance: Issues for Public
and Private Companies, in GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS COMPLIANCE at *5 (2011), 2011 WL
2117934 (“When developing an FCPA compliance program, it is important for a company to
institute a zero tolerance policy for bribery and corruption--one that sets an appropriate tone
at the top of the company, so that the company’s employees are aware that it does not tolerate
bribery in any form.”).
184 See, e.g., ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, APEC CODE OF CONDUCT FOR BUSINESS
(2007),
http://publications.apec.org/Publications/2007/09/APEC-Anticorruption-Code-ofConduct-for-Business-September-2007 (“The [anti-corruption] [p]rogram should encourage
employees and others to raise concerns and report suspicious circumstances to responsible
enterprise officials as early as possible.”).
185 Cf. supra Sections II.B & III.B.
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company’s anti-corruption policy, may be exposing herself to
retaliation by her employer without any legal recourse or remedy.
The United States’ enactment in 1977 of the seminal FCPA,
which “mak[es] it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities
to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in
obtaining or retaining business,”186 ignited a global movement to
combat illicit corporate dealings with foreign government officials
and led to the creation and development of the anti-corruption
compliance industry.187 The FCPA addresses international
corruption through its anti-bribery provisions, which prohibit
covered individuals and business entities from bribing foreign
government officials in order to obtain or retain business.188
Moreover, the FCPA’s accounting provisions operate in tandem with
the anti-bribery provisions to (1) impose certain recordkeeping and
internal controls requirements on covered entities and (2) prohibit
knowingly falsifying books and records or circumventing or failing
to implement a system of internal controls.189 Sharing enforcement
authority, the SEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ) continue
to treat the FCPA as a high-priority enforcement area.190

186
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act (last updated Feb. 3,
2017).
187 See Jordan, supra note 181, at 93 (noting that the FCPA is “the oldest and premier
foreign bribery law that has served as a template for other foreign bribery laws throughout
the world”).
188 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2018).
189 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)–(b) (2018) (mandating registered securities issuers to file records
with the SEC and prohibiting knowing falsification of these records); see also S. REP. NO. 95114, at 3 (1977) (“In the past, corporate bribery has been concealed by the falsification of
corporate books and records. [The accounting provision] removes this avenue of coverup,
reinforcing the criminal sanctions which are intended to serve as the significant deterrent to
corporate bribery. Taken together, the accounting requirements and criminal prohibitions . . .
should effectively deter corporate bribery of foreign government officials.”).
190 See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified Nov. 17, 2020) (listing the
SEC’s FCPA enforcement actions by calendar year); Enforcement Actions, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/related-enforcement-actions (last updated July
2, 2020) (listing DOJ’s FCPA enforcement actions by calendar year); see also Adam Pollock &
Sarah Bayer, Whistleblowers and the FCPA under the Trump Administration, N.Y.L.J. (June
12, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/06/12/whistleblowersand-the-fcpa-under-the-trump-administration/?slreturn=20190712151711 (“Contrary to the
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B. ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE AND WHISTLEBLOWERS

Whistleblowers play a critical role in FCPA compliance and
enforcement efforts.191 Assistance from whistleblowers who know of
potential FCPA violations “can be among the most powerful
weapons in the law enforcement arsenal” because these
whistleblowers know the circumstances and individuals involved,
which otherwise may be shrouded in secrecy.192 They can help
government agencies identify potential violations “much earlier”
than otherwise possible, thereby minimizing potential harms to
investors, preserving capital market integrity, and holding corrupt
actors accountable more swiftly.193
While the FCPA contains neither anti-retaliation provisions nor
any other whistleblower protections or private rights of action,194
SOX and Dodd–Frank feature certain provisions that may protect
whistleblowers who report FCPA violations.195 These statutes may
provide federal protection against employer retaliation for
whistleblowers who report FCPA violations, though uncertainty
exists as to their applicability given recent court decisions.196
expectations of many who thought that enforcement of the [FCPA] would dissipate with the
arrival of the Trump administration, it is very much alive.”).
191 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Cash for Your Conscience: Do Whistleblower Incentives
Improve Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1106 (2018) (“Whistleblowers are critical to compliance with and enforcement of the FCPA.”);
Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More Flexible
Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1635–36 (2008) (highlighting
employees’ “unique” abilities to detect and prevent wrongdoing).
192 CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 82 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA
RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/download.
193 Id.
194 Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 998 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (“[T]he
FCPA does not itself protect whistleblowers: it contains no anti-retaliation provisions and
affords no private cause of action.”).
195 FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 192, at 82 (“The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and
the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 both contain provisions affecting whistleblowers who report
FCPA violations.”).
196 See Ryan Rohlfsen & Andrew Kaplan, Catnip for Whistleblowers: The Status of SOX
Whistleblower Protections in FCPA Cases, ROPES & GRAY (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2019/03/Catnip-for-Whistleblowers-TheStatus-of-SOX-Whistleblower-Protections-in-FCPA-Cases (discussing the effects of recent
decisions upon FCPA whistleblower protections).
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The combined strength of the FCPA, SOX, and Dodd–Frank
serves as a formidable tool for the DOJ and SEC to combat
corruption across industries.197 Among its major elements, SOX
extends whistleblower protections for employees of publicly traded
companies by providing reinstatement, back pay, and other
compensation remedies for employees who experience retaliation in
connection with reporting possible securities law violations.198 As
discussed earlier in this Article, SOX’s section 806 specifically
prohibits such companies from retaliating against an employee who
lawfully reports “any conduct which the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of [18 U.S.C.] section 1341 [mail
fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities
fraud], any rule or regulation of the [SEC], or any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders . . . .”199
Reporting an FCPA books-and-records violation would seemingly
constitute protected SOX conduct, as the FCPA is an amendment to,
and codified within, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934200 and also
is an apparent “law relating to fraud against shareholders.”201 Thus,
See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to
2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 117 (2010) (“[SOX] created a situation in which corporate
executives can now be held personally accountable for any misleading financial information
hidden behind the numbers of financial statements. Combined with FCPA, SOX creates a
double-edged sword for the SEC to wield in the battle against corruption.”); Bradley J.
McAllister, The Impact of the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Provisions on FCPA Enforcement
and Modern Corporate Compliance Programs, 14 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 46 (2017) (“The
FCPA, SOX, and Dodd–Frank work in conjunction to create a patchwork of laws that
predominate over corporate compliance for [publicly] traded companies.” ).
198 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2018) (outlining the available remedies under SOX). Congress
included the anti-retaliation provisions “to prevent employers from discouraging employees
with knowledge of improper financial reporting and accounting practices from reporting.”
Westbrook, supra note 191, at 1121.
199 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). SOX also prohibits retaliation against employee whistleblowers
as an obstruction of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2018) (prohibiting relatiation against
informants); see also Sarah O’Rourke Schrup, Obstruction of Justice: Unwarranted Expansion
of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1), 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 25–26 (2013) (describing how
SOX affected the federal obstruction of justice statute).
200 See Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., No. 15-cv-02356-JCS, 2017 WL 1910057, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. May 10, 2017) (“[T]he FCPA is an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
and is codified within it.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 916 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2019).
201 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1); see also Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive
Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that the
SOX whistleblower provision covers information disclosures related to bribery of public
197
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an employee who lawfully reports an alleged FCPA violation is
arguably engaging in protected activity under SOX section 806.
However, the Ninth Circuit recently disagreed with this view: in
Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., it held that the FCPA’s anti-bribery
and books-and-records provisions are not “rules or regulations of the
SEC” under SOX section 806.202 Bio-Rad involved the company’s
former general counsel, Sanford Wadler, who believed that Bio-Rad
employees in China had violated the FCPA and that the company’s
“senior management was likely complicit”; accordingly, he notified
the company’s chief executive and the audit committee of its board
of directors.203 The company later fired Wadler.204 In addressing the
merits of the issue raised on appeal, the court reasoned that “rule or
regulation” of the SEC refers only to administrative rules or
regulations and does not encompass statutes such as the FCPA.205
Through the court’s narrow reading of what constitutes a “rule or
regulation” of the SEC, complaints of FCPA violations do not
constitute protected activity under SOX. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
narrowed the scope of whistleblower protections available under
SOX and limited whistleblower protections available to employees
who face retaliation for reporting FCPA violations.206
While the Ninth Circuit’s Bio-Rad decision curbed SOX’s
protections for whistleblowers who face retaliation for reporting
FCPA violations, employees are better positioned to receive
protection under Dodd–Frank. With Dodd–Frank’s passage in
officials, including foreign officials). But see Gupta v. Johnson & Johnson, Case No. 2010SOX-54, 2011 WL 121916, at *5 (Dep’t of Labor Jan. 7, 2011) (“[A] violation of the FPCA is
not within the scope of SOX.”).
202 Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 916 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e hold that
§ 806’s text is clear: an FCPA provision is not a ‘rule or regulation of the [SEC].’” (second
alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2018))).
203 Id. at 1182.
204 Id. at 1184.
205 Id. at 1186 (“[T]he more natural and plain reading of these words together and in context
is that they refer only to administrative rules or regulations. That the phrase ‘rule or
regulation’ is used in conjunction with an administrative agency, the SEC, suggests that it
encompasses only administrative rules or regulations.”).
206 See, e.g., Rohlfsen & Kaplan, supra note 196 (analyzing the effects of the Bio-Rad
decision); Steve Pearlman & Pinny Goldberg, Wadler v. Bio-Rad Poses Noteworthy
Whistleblower Questions, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1135086/wadler-v-bio-rad-poses-noteworthywhistleblower-questions
(evaluating
the
consequences of Bio-Rad).
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2010,207 Congress strengthened the FCPA’s enforcement power
while imposing detailed regulations on the financial services
industry to detect and prevent fraud and corruption.208 As the
legislative history indicates, Congress enacted Dodd–Frank in part
to provide more stringent measures to protect whistleblowers than
SOX provides.209 As described above, Dodd–Frank addresses
whistleblower protections and incentives through, inter alia, its
anti-retaliation provision210 and its grant of authority to the SEC to
administer a bounty program to eligible individuals.211 However,
these robust protections do little for whistleblowers adhering to
compliance programs and internal policies, because, as discussed
earlier in this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Digital
Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers212 excludes from Dodd–Frank’s
protections whistleblowers who report internally but not to the
SEC.213 Thus, as evident in the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Bio-Rad,
whistleblowers who follow a company’s compliance program or code
of conduct to report an apparent FCPA violation internally are not
covered under Dodd–Frank when facing employer retaliation unless
such whistleblowers also reported to the SEC.214
In light of these shortcomings surrounding Dodd–Frank and
SOX, employees who witness corrupt workplace conduct and report
such behavior may be exposing themselves to retaliation and
See supra note 123.
See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing
reforms of the U.S. financial regulatory system through the enactment of Dodd–Frank).
209 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 114 (2010) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1514A to clarify that
“subsidiaries and affiliates of issuers [in addition to the issuers themselves] may not retaliate
against whistleblowers”); 156 CONG. REC. S5873 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Cardin) (amending SOX “to extend whistleblower protections to employees of nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations”); see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION 15 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.
pdf (indicating reform goals to “[s]trengthen [i]nvestor [p]rotection” by “expanding protections
for whistleblowers [and] expanding sanctions available for enforcement”).
210 See supra Section III.B.
211 See supra notes 124–127 and accompanying text.
212 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
213 See supra notes 161–167 and accompanying text.
214 Wadler v. Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc., 916 F.3d 1176, 1182 (2019) (vacating the Dodd–
Frank verdict connected to reporting an FCPA violation in light of Digital Realty Trust,
“which held that Dodd-Frank does not apply to purely internal reports”).
207
208
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negative treatment from their employers without any legal recourse
or remedy. If employees report internally, in accordance with
company anti-corruption policies, but not to the SEC, they may not
receive protection under Dodd–Frank, and SOX protection may
separately remain unavailable.215 Moreover, even if an employee
reports the corrupt conduct directly to the SEC, she still may not
receive legal protection from any ensuing retaliation, depending
upon the nature of the corrupt conduct.216 As corporate anticorruption policies generally cover a wide scope of behavior that can
be considered corrupt, the policies may prohibit certain conduct that
could in fact be legally permissible in the United States, where no
retaliation protection would apply.217 To highlight this gap, the
following sections demonstrate how the anti-corruption corporate
compliance domain targets certain conduct pertaining to the FCPA
and separately to domestic commercial bribery laws, encouraging
reporting of such conduct that could nevertheless expose employees
to workplace retaliation without legal recourse.
1. Facilitating Payments under the FCPA: Legally Permissible in
the United States, Yet Widely Prohibited by Corporate AntiCorruption Policies. The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions cast a wide
net in prohibiting foreign bribes, but they contain a narrow
exception for “facilitating or expediting payment[s],”218 also known
as “grease” payments,219 made in furtherance of “routine
governmental action.”220 Intending to provide a “very limited
exception[] to the kinds of bribes to which the FCPA does not
apply,”221 Congress drafted this exception to capture “those
payments which merely move a particular matter toward an
eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary
action.”222 The exception applies when payment is made to a “foreign
official” in order to further “routine governmental action” that

See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
See supra Section IV.A.
217 See supra Section III.B.
218 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (2018).
219 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2004).
220 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b); see also Kay, 359 F.3d at 750–51 (providing
examples of “[r]outine governmental action”).
221 Kay, 359 F.3d at 750.
222 H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977).
215
216
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involves non-discretionary acts.223 Examples of routine
governmental action include obtaining permits or licenses to qualify
a person to conduct business in a foreign country, processing visas,
providing mail service or police protection, or supplying utilities,
such as power, water, and phone service.224
Facilitating payments that qualify within the exception would
not constitute FCPA violations but nevertheless may violate laws in
foreign countries where the company issuing the facilitating
payments operates. For instance, facilitating payments are illegal
in the United Kingdom under the U.K. Bribery Act 2010,225 and the
U.K. Ministry of Justice has condemned the payments for
“creat[ing] artificial distinctions that are difficult to enforce,
undermin[ing] corporate anti-bribery procedures, confus[ing] antibribery communication with employees and other associated
persons, perpetuat[ing] an existing ‘culture’ of bribery and hav[ing]
the potential to be abused.”226 Thus, companies making genuine
facilitating payments may still be subjecting themselves to possible
sanctions.227 The OECD Working Group on Bribery recommends
that all OECD signatory countries “encourage companies to prohibit
or discourage the use of facilitation payments” through internal
controls and anti-corruption ethics and compliance programs,
signaling to companies the ethically objectionable nature of these
payments.228

223 See id. (noting that the congressional committee intentionally “exclud[ed] from the
definition of ‘foreign official’ government employees whose duties are essentially ministerial
or clerical”); see also Kay, 359 F.3d at 751 (“[R]outine governmental action does not include
the issuance of every official document or every inspection, but only (1) documentation that
qualifies a party to do business and (2) scheduling an inspection—very narrow categories of
largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities performed by mid- or low-level foreign
functionaries.”).
224 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), 78dd-2(h)(4)(A), 78dd-3(f)(4)(A) (2018).
225 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
226 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE para. 45, at 18 (2011),
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf.
227 See id. (stating that “the Bribery Act does not . . . provide any exemption for [facilitating]
payments,” unlike U.S. law).
228 OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, RECOMMENDATION OF
THE COUNCIL FOR FURTHER COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § VI, at 5 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/corruption/antibribery/OECD-Anti-Bribery-Recommendation-ENG.pdf (providing these recommendations
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As companies often express a zero-tolerance approach in their
anti-corruption policies and seek to prohibit any conduct that could
be considered corrupt in any jurisdiction where they do business,
facilitating payments fall within the scope of bribes as defined in
many anti-corruption policies within company handbooks.229
Indeed, roughly eighty percent of U.S. companies prohibit
facilitating payments through their policies,230 with many
companies noting explicitly that facilitating payments fall within
the scope of their bribery prohibition policies.231 For example, the
Anti-Bribery Policy of Coca-Cola states that “[t]he Company’s
prohibition on bribery applies to all improper payments regardless
of size or purpose, including ‘facilitating’ (or expediting)
payments.”232 These policies typically apply to all employees,

“in view of the corrosive effect of small facilitation payments, particularly on sustainable
economic development and the rule of law”).
229
See,
e.g.,
Anti-Corruption
Policy,
FRANKLIN
TEMPLETON,
https://www.franklintempleton.com/financial-professionals/help/anti-corruption (last visited
Nov. 14, 2020) (“This overview of Franklin Resources, Inc. Anti-Corruption Policy outlines the
principles that FRI and its affiliates . . . follow to achieve zero-tolerance against bribery and
corruption.”); Zero Tolerance Approach to Bribery and Corruption, ING GROUP,
https://www.ing.com/About-us/Compliance/Zero-Tolerance-Bribery-Statement.htm
(last
visited Nov. 14, 2020) (explaining ING’s “zero tolerance approach” to bribery and corruption
and that the approach applies to third parties with whom ING does business or who ING
retains). But see Marc Le Menestrel, Zero-Tolerance Policies are Dishonest and Damaging,
THE FCPA BLOG (Feb. 6, 2019, 1:08 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2019/2/6/zero-tolerancepolicies-are-dishonest-and-damaging/ (arguing that moral and ethical decisionmaking is a
grey area and that a “zero-tolerance stance towards corruption is neither necessarily honest
nor desirable”).
230 R. Christopher Cook & Stephanie L. Connor, OECD Calls for an End to Facilitating
DAY:
INSIGHTS
(Dec.
2009),
Payments
Exception,
JONES
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2009/12/oecd-calls-for-an-end-to-facilitatingpayments-exception (stating that “80 percent of U.S. companies prohibit facilitating
payments altogether”).
231
See, e.g., Anti-Corruption Program and Policies, LOCKHEED MARTIN,
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/who-we-are/ethics/anti-corruption.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2020) (“The policy strictly prohibits facilitating payments.”).
232
Anti-Bribery
Policy,
THE
COCA-COLA
COMPANY,
https://www.cocacolacompany.com/policies-and-practices/anti-bribery-policy (last visited Nov. 14, 2020)
(“Generally, facilitation payments are prohibited by this Policy, except for a very limited set
of circumstances for which prior written approval must be obtained from both Company Legal
Counsel and E&C.”).
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officers, directors, and third party agents worldwide working on
behalf of the employer company.233
As companies encourage their employees and agents to promptly
report internally any behavior that may represent a violation of the
company’s anti-corruption policy,234 an employee who observes a
colleague issue a facilitating payment to a foreign government
official and subsequently reports such conduct, in line with the
expectations created by the employer’s anti-corruption policies,
risks suffering from possible retaliation from the employer.235 No
federal law would apply to protect the employee in blowing the
whistle.236 Facilitating payments to foreign government officials are
permissible under the FCPA yet condemned on ethical grounds and
banned by law in other jurisdictions.237 As a result, a whistleblower
who reports such payments as directed by a company’s anticorruption policy may, by that very act, expose herself to retaliation
without legal recourse.
2. Commercial Bribery Payments: Legally Permissible in Some
U.S. Jurisdictions, Yet Widely Prohibited by Corporate AntiCorruption Policies. Commercial bribery presents another area of
exposure for whistleblowers in the anti-corruption domain. Also
known as private bribery or business-to-business bribery,

233 See, e.g., EXXONMOBIL, ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGAL COMPLIANCE GUIDE 4 (2014),
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/policy/Anti-Corruption-LegalCompliance-Guide.pdf (“It is the policy of Exxon Mobil Corporation that directors, officers,
employees, and third parties acting on its behalf are prohibited from offering or paying,
directly or indirectly, any bribe to any employee, official, or agent of any government,
commercial entity, or individual in connection with the business or activities of the
Corporation.”); Ping Identity Corporation Anti-corruption Policy, PING IDENTITY,
https://www.pingidentity.com/en/legal/anticorruption.html (last revised Mar. 6, 2018) (“This
policy applies to all world-wide directors, officers, employees, partners, agents, distributors,
resellers, representatives and contractors . . . .”).
234 See, e.g., COCA-COLA HELLENIC BOTTLING CO., ANTI-BRIBERY POLICY & COMPLIANCE
HANDBOOK 8, https://ch.coca-colahellenic.com/en/policies (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) (“If you
observe behaviour that concerns you, or that may represent a violation of our Policy, raise the
issue promptly with your Relevant Legal Officer. . . . Suspected Policy violations of a serious
nature, such as those involving high levels of management, significant amounts, or alleged
criminal activities should be reported to the General Counsel immediately.”).
235 See supra Section IV.A.
236 See supra Section IV.B.
237 See Cook & Connor, supra note 230 (stating that many countries prohibit facilitating
payments whereas the FCPA permits certain facilitating payments).
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commercial bribery at common law is an “offer of consideration to
another’s employee or agent in the expectation that the latter will,
without fully informing his principal of the ‘gift,’ be sufficiently
influenced by the offer to favor the offeror over other competitors.”238
Transpiring entirely within the private sector and involving no
public official, the offense involves the transfer of money or other
form of kickback to employees or other agents in exchange for
special treatment to the briber.239
To illustrate, imagine a private school tasks its purchasing agent
to buy a set of printers for school use, and the agent contacts an
office supply company. The agent discovers the printers’ fair market
value after selecting the specific printer model. Rather than
negotiating with the office supply company to reach the lowest
possible price, the agent agrees with the company’s salesperson to
purchase the printers on behalf of the school at a cost significantly
higher than their fair market value. In exchange, the office supply
company gives the purchasing agent a significant kickback for
boosting the company’s profits. This arrangement exemplifies
commercial bribery, as the office supply company secretly pays the
purchasing agent to influence the agent’s official act, obtaining the
printers for the school. The essence of this offense involves the
corruption of the employee or other type of agent, where, for
instance, the briber offers a bribe to an employee with the intent to
induce the employee to act in the interest of the briber instead of the
employer.240 When an agent accepts a bribe, he violates a duty of
loyalty to his principal and “abuses his [principal]’s trust and loyalty
for his own economic benefit.”241

238 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 49 (3d ed. 1968).
239 See Jeffrey R. Boles, The Two Faces of Bribery: International Corruption Pathways Meet
Conflicting Legislative Regimes, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 681 (2014) (“The offense involves
the bribing of private sector employees or other types of private sector agents so that the
agents show favor to the briber when carrying out their workplace duties.”).
240 Mantek Div. of NCH Corp. v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702, 705 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The
essence of commercial bribery is that the [briber] is secretly giving a bribe to the . . . agent to
induce the agent to betray his principal . . . .”).
241 Peter Burckhardt & Benjamin Borsodi, Switzerland Tightens Anti-Corruption Laws,
Focuses on Private Sector Bribery, 23 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 213, 214 (2007).
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Commercial bribery has been condemned as deceptive
commercial conduct that creates tangible economic harm.242 A
“regretfully common practice,” it runs rampant across many
industries.243 It is a “marketplace mainstay[]” that is “tolerated
everywhere,” and demonstrated through payments to obtain
business across industries.244 In spite of its harmful nature and
widespread prevalence, no comprehensive federal legislation
criminalizes commercial bribery domestically or internationally.245
It is inconsistently criminalized at the state level in the United
States, with thirty-nine states having enacted general statutes that
criminalize commercial bribery across industries.246 More
specifically, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming
have not enacted a general prohibition on commercial bribery.247
Internationally, however, there is a growing movement to combat
commercial bribery through the enactment of domestic criminal
laws, with the U.K. Bribery Act 2010248 and Ireland’s Criminal
Justice (Corruption Offences) Act 2018249 as examples of legislation
that
criminalize
commercial
bribery
domestically
and
250
internationally.

242 See, e.g., Proposed RICO Reform Legislation: Hearing on S. 1523 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 390–91 (1987) [hereinafter Proposed RICO Reform Legislation]
(statement of John A. Kocur, President, Apache Corporation) (discussing the harm to an oil
company defrauded by commercial bribery); Jeffrey Boles, Examining the Lax Treatment of
Commercial Bribery in the United States: A Prescription for Reform, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 121
(2014) (“Companies disadvantaged and defrauded by the practice argue that the practice
creates tangible economic harm.”).
243 United States v. Kristel, 762 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
244 Joel Cohen, Commercial Kickbacks: A Crime for the Recession, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 17, 1992,
at 4 (describing types of kickback payments in different industries).
245 See Ira Handa, Fallacies in the Current Methods of Prosecuting International
Commercial Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 725, 727 (2016) (“While the FCPA addresses bribery
of public officials internationally, the United States does not have a comprehensive statute
that specifically addresses commercial bribery internationally.”).
246 Boles, supra note 242, at 129–30.
247 Id. at 130 n.64.
248 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 1, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents.
249
Criminal Justice (Corruption Offences) Act 2018 (Act No. 9/2018),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/9/enacted/en/html.
250 See Boles, supra note 239, at 688 (discussing growing international efforts to combat
commercial bribery).
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Given the potential risk for legal exposure and reputational
harm, the legal industry is increasingly advising its corporate
clients to review their anti-corruption policies, procedures, and
training materials to ensure that they cover domestic and foreign
commercial bribery, in addition to public-sector bribery.251 Many
companies include commercial bribery risk as a component of their
compliance programs.252 For instance, Moody’s Anti-Bribery and
Anti-Corruption Policy makes clear: “Commercial bribery (not
involving public officials) is also illegal in many countries. This
Policy prohibits all commercial or public sector bribery.”253
With a growing number of companies prohibiting commercial
bribery as part of their anti-corruption policies, their employees are
encouraged to promptly report such conduct internally.254
Employees who witness their colleagues engaging in commercial
bribery and internally report it—in compliance with their
employers’ anti-corruption policies—expose themselves to possible
retaliation from their employers.255 Worse, no federal law would
251 See, e.g., M. Scott Peeler, Glenn C. Colton, Kay C. Georgi, Terree A. Bowers & Peter V.B.
Unger, Don’t Forget Commercial Bribery: New Laws and Convictions Highlight an Often
FOX
(June
18,
2018),
Overlooked
Risk,
ARENT
https://www.arentfox.com/perspectives/alerts/dont-forget-commercial-bribery-new-laws-andconvictions-highlight-often (advising that companies adequately cover commercial bribery, in
addition to other forms of corruption, in their policies and training materials); William M.
Sullivan, Jr., G. Derek Andreson, Robert J. Nolan, Ryan R. Sparacino & Wesley M. Spowhn,
Commercial Bribery: What GCs Should Know About the Achilles Heel of Anti-Bribery Law,
PILLSBURY L. (Mar. 9, 2012), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/3/9/v2/3952/
CorporateInvestigationsWhiteCollarDefenseAlertComplianceProgramO.pdf
(“[I]n-house
counsel should ensure that the company’s anti-corruption program provides sufficient
protection against commercial bribery risks.”).
252 See Stacey Sprenkel, Amanda Aikman & Sarak Thomas, Recent Legal Developments
May Encourage Companies to Commit More Fully to Ethical Business Conduct, ETHISPHERE:
MAGAZINE (Oct. 7, 2015), https://magazine.ethisphere.com/commercial-bribery/ (“[S]ending a
clear message that all bribery is prohibited, regardless of the setting, will make for a more
effective compliance program overall.”).
253 MOODY’S, ANTI-BRIBERY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY 1 (2016), https://www.moodys.
com/uploadpage/Mco%20Documents/SP21200_AntiBribery_AntiCorruption.pdf.
254 See id. at 6 (requiring employees to report facilitation payments to Moody’s Legal
Department immediately after such payments are made).
255 See Nicole H. Sprinzen, Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) L.L.C.: A Case Study of the Limits
of Dodd–Frank Anti-Retaliation Protections and the Impact on Corporate Compliance
Objectives, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 151, 191 (2014) (noting that whistleblowers who try to report
violations internally often are “ignored, rebuffed, or retaliated against”).
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protect these whistleblowing employees.256 Commercial bribery
remains uncriminalized in several U.S. states, yet commercial
bribes are condemned on economic and ethical grounds and banned
in other jurisdictions.257 Given that commercial bribery violations of
a company’s anti-corruption policies and procedures are generally
not covered under federal law and may not be criminalized in
certain states, reporting such commercial bribes under a company’s
anti-corruption policy may expose the whistleblower to retaliation
without any legal protection.
In sum, the expansive development of compliance efforts in the
commercial sector has generated organizational policies, codes of
conduct, compliance programs, and other initiatives that exceed the
applicable requirements under federal law. As reflected in the EEO,
securities regulation, and anti-corruption domains, this gap in
coverage exposes whistleblowers to retaliation without legal
protection when they adhere to their employers’ policies and report
wrongdoing. The following Part proposes solutions to this problem.

V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Due to the statutory limitations in EEO, anti-fraud, and anticorruption law, numerous employees across various industries are
excluded from the law’s robust protections when they follow internal
company policies and compliance programs. To protect such
individuals and facilitate the continued use of such internal
programs, we propose alternative theories of redress, housed in
contract law and tort law, for such individuals. We also recommend
that regulators consider specific amendments to the laws and
guidelines that govern various compliance industries.
A. ALTERNATIVES TO CONTRACT APPROACHES

Internal company codes and compliance programs outlining
norms of expected behavior are not typically viewed as contracts
256 See Handa, supra note 245, at 734 (“[N]o federal law explicitly prohibits international
commercial bribery . . . .”).
257 See Boles, supra note 242, at 129–30, 143 (stating that, while eleven states currently do
not criminalize commercial bribery, thirty-nine states have outlawed commercial bribery, and
most courts “condemn the offense” for its many “corrosive effects”).
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given the infeasibility of arguing that every element of a binding
contract has been established in such instances.258 As a result,
arguing that internal codes of conduct and compliance programs
establish a binding promise as to the terms and conditions of
employment is difficult, and establishing that any aspect of an
internal code of conduct or compliance program would provide an
exception to employment-at-will is nearly impossible.259 However,
the legal doctrine surrounding employee handbooks traditionally
supported viewing such documents as binding contracts if certain
conditions are met.260 Under this traditional view, which originated
in the 1980s, an “exception to the employment-at-will rule”
establishes job security-related promises that would be viewed as
contractually binding on the employer.261 However, employers
increasingly include disclaimers in employee handbooks explicitly
stating that these are not contracts, and courts routinely uphold
such disclaimers, rendering the alleged contract unenforceable.262
See infra notes 265–270.
See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 149, 175 (2005) (noting reluctance in courts “to enforce corporate codes as enforceable
promises”).
260 See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13
INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 337 (1991) (discussing the history of various courts holding that
employee handbooks are binding contracts).
261 Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 195 (2007) (discussing the exception to the employment-atwill rule as it pertains to employee handbooks); see also Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Cmty.
Servs., Inc., 19 F.3d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant-employer was
contractually bound to follow the termination provisions of the employee handbook under
which the plaintiff was hired); Orly Lobel, Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in
Intellectual Property Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 869, 881 (2016) (“In most jurisdictions, for an
employee handbook to constitute a binding contract, the employer must demonstrate that:
‘(1) the language of the policy statement contains a promise clear enough that an employee
would reasonably believe that an offer has been made, (2) the statement was disseminated to
the employee in such a manner that the employee was aware of its content and reasonably
believed it to be an offer, and (3) the employee accepted the offer by commencing or continuing
work after learning of the policy statement.’” (quoting Ricco v. Sw. Surgery Ctr., LLC, 73 F.
Supp. 3d 961, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2014))).
262 See, e.g., Workman v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that such disclaimers are “a complete defense to a suit for breach of contract based
on an employee handbook”); Fischl, supra note 261, at 195 (“When the so-called ‘employee
handbook’ exception to employment at will took hold in the 1980s, many employers reacted
by attempting to rewrite their materials to opt back into the employment-at-will rule via
disclaimers of job security.”); Elinor P. Schroeder, Handbooks, Disclaimers, and Harassment
258
259
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With both of these contract-based avenues of protection unavailable
to vulnerable whistleblowers, one possible solution is to turn to
alternatives to contract theories that support the public policy of
protecting individuals who follow company compliance codes and
experience retaliation as a result.
The basic elements of a binding contract include offer,
acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms
of the agreement, all of which are established through a meeting of
the minds to enter into the agreed upon terms and conditions of the
contract.263 Internal codes of conduct and compliance programs are
broadly applicable documents—they are not exclusive to any
individual in the sense that no single offeree would possess the
power of acceptance to the employer-offeror’s offer in a way that
establishes mutual agreement to the specified conditions that
govern that individual’s employment.264 Not only is this the case
because an internal company code or compliance program is not
directed or communicated to one offeree, but also because the
subject matter of such a program is simply not relevant to one’s own
unique employment situation and instead relates to broader themes
of organizational governance, internal systems and channels, and
the overall ethical functioning of an enterprise.265 Although
employees are often asked to sign a statement that they have
received their organization’s code of ethics or compliance program,
there is no certainty that they have actually read or fully understood
the document or are aware of ongoing efforts to adopt the code as
part of a daily work dialogue.266 In light of the fact that employees

Policies: Another Look at Clark County School District v. Breeden, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 581, 581–
82 (2004) (discussing the decrease of the employee handbook exception by states).
263 See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:3 (4th ed. 2007)
(detailing the necessary elements to form a contract).
264 See Lierz v. Coca Cola Enter., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (D. Kan. 1999) (rejecting
an employee’s claims that the company code of conduct constituted “an express contract of
employment”).
265 See Timothy L. Fort, Steps for Building Ethics Programs, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 194,
197–98 (2005) (noting the need for employee “buy-in” for ethical codes due to the general and
pedantic nature of many codes).
266 See id. at 196 (discussing conclusions drawn from informal surveys of executive
education business students as to whether “codes of conduct permeate the lives of
employees”); see also Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in
Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211,
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are not specifically agreeing to take action in exchange for
something else, the argument that there is bargained-for exchange
or consideration in such scenarios is infeasible.267 As a result, a
breach of contract claim on the part of an employee who is retaliated
against for adhering to company policy is not viable.268
As an alternative, courts should apply legal claims of promissory
estoppel to any employee that relies on an internal policy, faces
retaliation, and then has no outlet for redress because the company
policy or program has extended beyond the confines of identifiable
legal protections available by statute. While a promise under
contract law is not enforceable unless supported by consideration, a
promissory estoppel claim renders binding a promise when doing so
would avoid injustice.269 Injustice would be avoided in cases in which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce an action or
forbearance by the promisee and that does induce the promisee’s
action or forbearance.270 In each of the examples discussed above,
260 n.320 (2006) (“All Enron employees were required to sign a certificate of compliance
confirming that they had read the corporate ethics code and agreed to comply with it.”).
267 See, e.g., Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[I]n order for a
contract to have valid consideration, the contract must be a bargained for exchange in which
there is a legal detriment of the promisee or a corresponding benefit to the promisor.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Frankina v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 801 F. Supp. 875, 886
(D. Mass. 1992))); Haselrig v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 19 F. Supp. 2d 392, 394 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(defining bargained-for exchange of consideration as “a specific, definite promise by each
party to perform some act” (quoting Tuman v. Genesis Assoc., 935 F. Supp. 1375, 1389 (E.D.
Pa. 1996))); P.R. Elec. Power Auth. v. Action Refund, 472 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 (D.P.R. 2006)
(“In order for a contract to have valid consideration, the contract must be a bargained-for
exchange in which there is a legal detriment of the promise[e] or a corresponding benefit to
the promisor.” (citing Neuhoff v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 370 F.3d 197, 201 (1st Cir.
2004))).
268 See Hinchey, 144 F.3d at 142 (noting that no contract can exist if there was a failure of
consideration).
269 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (defining
promissory estoppel as “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”).
270 While the precise elements of a promissory estoppel claim vary by state, the definition
included here is representative of the common elements contained among the states. See id.;
see also Davis v. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (W.D. Ky.
2005), aff’d, 279 F. App’x 378 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (discussing the requirements of a
promissory estoppel claim); Skallerup v. City of Hot Springs, 309 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Ark. 2009)
(“Promissory estoppel applies when the elements of a contract cannot be shown.” (citing
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the employer promises non-retaliation for adherence to provisions
in the company policy that require internal reporting of either
company or legal and regulatory violations.271 From the standpoint
of any employee, the employer’s promise of non-retaliation should
result in the employer reasonably expecting that employees will rely
on this statement and take action based on that specific promise
without fear of reprisal.272 Even if a company policy or compliance
program were to not explicitly make the promise of non-retaliation
on the face of the document, if such a program requires or mandates
any kind of reporting, this mandate should suffice as an implicit
promise that the employer will not retaliate against any employee
who simply adheres to that policy. Any other interpretation would
be injurious to basic notions of fairness and equity, a cornerstone
upon which promissory estoppel claims are based.273
Numerous public policy reasons justify protecting employees and
whistleblowers who report internally, particularly in situations
where an employer has essentially required internal reporting and
then retaliates against those who follow the policy.274 In addition to
Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818, 819–20 (Ark. 1964))); Eric Mills
Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 287 (1996) (“The
circumstances which may trigger the application of promissory estoppel in this case cannot
be tortured into the requisite elements of a traditional contract. A contract and promissory
estoppel are two different creatures of the law; they are not legally synonymous; the birth of
one does not spawn the other.” (quoting Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 326
S.E.2d 395, 406 (S.C. 1985))).
271 See supra Parts II–IV.
272 See Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975,
993 (2008) (noting that “best practices” for corporate compliance encourage employees to
report misconduct); see also Kylie M. Huff, Note, The Case for an FCPA Exception to Dodd–
Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 867, 879 (2016) (noting that
promises of anti-retaliation “assure[] whistleblowers that they will not be retaliated against
by their employers for coming forward”).
273 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“[P]romissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and as such is intended to counteract the
occasional harshness of common law rules . . . .” (citing Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 490 S.E.2d 184, 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997))); Smith v. Hi-Speed, Inc., 536 S.W.3d
458, 483 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (“[P]romissory estoppel ‘is an equitable doctrine, and its limits
are defined by equity and reason.’” (quoting Chavez v. Broadway Elec. Serv., 245 S.W.3d 398,
404 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007))).
274 See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 319
(1992) (discussing the benefits to society of whistleblowing); Martin H. Malin, Protecting the
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the societal benefits that employees and whistleblowers provide in
bringing information about fraud and other wrongdoing to light, a
strong public policy interest supports the existence of employer
protections for whistleblowers, as credible promises of nonretaliation result in better organizational and corporate governance,
proper self-regulation, the facilitation of effective internal
compliance programs, and more efficient government oversight.275
Employer anti-retaliation policies also encourage prompt reporting
of organizational concerns that result in early and relatively
amicable resolutions of potentially unethical, illegal, or dangerous
workplace situations.276 In a practical sense, an employer’s interest
in “self preservation” also supports enforceable employer-provided
protections from retaliation, as opposed to protections from
retaliation that are only available when employees report externally
to a government agency.277 If an employee circumvents internal
reporting and reports externally because doing so is the only
mechanism for ensuring protection from retaliation, the employer is
forced to manage the situation by responding to the government
agency without first being able to address the problem internally.278
As one court explained:
The situation is no better for the responsible employer,
who would be deprived of information which may be
vital to the lawful operation of the workplace unless and
until the employee deems the problem serious enough
to warrant a report directly to a law enforcement
agency. Clearly, the fundamental public interest in a

Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 277–78 (1983)
(discussing the public policy arguments in support of whistleblowing).
275 See Moberly, supra note 272, at 1006–07 (discussing the benefits of anti-retaliation
promises as a form of self-regulation within a company).
276 See Verduzco v. Gen. Dynamics, Convair Div., 742 F. Supp. 559, 561–62 (S.D. Cal. 1990)
(discussing the public policy benefits of encouraging whistleblowing in the workplace).
277 Collier v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 453, 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the
employer’s and employee’s interest in retaliation protections).
278 Id. (noting that if the employee must report externally, the employer “would be in the
unfortunate position of responding to a public agency without first having had an opportunity
to deal internally with the suspected problem”).
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workplace free from illegal practices would not be
served by this result.279
Given the important public policy interests at stake in such
circumstances, injustice would be avoided if courts upheld employer
promises of non-retaliation for adhering to internal policies.
Alternatively, employees should be able to rely on quasi-contract
claims when seeking redress for retaliation in the circumstances
discussed in this Article, which largely center around instances in
which employees have relied on an employer’s directive or request
in working toward a collective organizational goal. Although the
precise elements of a quasi-contract claim differ among
jurisdictions, they generally include “elements of reliance (the
plaintiff’s loss) and . . . unjust enrichment (the defendant’s gain).”280
This gives courts “broad discretion” to provide remedies for
aggrieved parties that promote general principles of fairness and
justice.281 Unlike contract law, in which liability is imposed on
defendants due to their breach of an agreed-upon obligation,
defendants are held liable in quasi-contract cases because “it serves
justice to do so,” thereby largely rendering the parties’ intentions
less relevant, except as may be important to determine whether the
defendant was unjustly enriched.282
Reasonable arguments exist for why the concept of unjust
enrichment is applicable to the situations discussed in this Article.
To prove unjust enrichment, the following elements typically must
be established: “(1) an enrichment; (2) an impoverishment; (3) a
connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) the
absence of a justification for the enrichment and impoverishment;
and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law.”283 When an

Id.
HOWARD HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:9 (2020), Westlaw.
281 Id.
282 Id. § 16:5.
283 66 AM. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts § 11 (2020), Westlaw. Just as
promissory estoppel claims vary by state as to their precise elements, so do claims for unjust
enrichment. The elements listed here reflect the common elements of unjust enrichment
claims among the various states. Some jurisdictions have adopted the elements of quasi
contract for unjust enrichment claims, the elements of which would include “(1) a benefit
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the
279
280
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employee blows the whistle or adheres to an internal reporting
policy by providing the employer with information about suspected
or known violations of internal company policy or violations of the
law, the “enrichment” obtained by the employer would be that the
employer now has the benefit of information that it did not
previously possess, information that is valuable to the employer.284
The employer is able to benefit on several organizational levels by
acting upon the information—actions may include: remedying an
emerging problem; investigating the issue; obtaining legal counsel
or consultants to manage the issue; and opting to self-report to a
government agency to obtain leniency, cooperation credit, or other
cooperation-based measures that will ultimately mitigate the
damage of a potential problem.285
While the value of information provided in this way is obviously
more challenging to calculate, one can feasibly draw parallels to
existing case law analyzing unjust enrichment claims in which
plaintiffs recovered when they shared confidential or novel
information with others who then adopted and used the information
for their own benefit.286 These cases have largely fallen within the
realm of intellectual property.287 Despite the difference in subject
matter from that discussed in this Article, the underlying premise
is the same—valuable information that employers would not have
known but for the whistleblowing of their employees results in the
employer’s ability to capitalize on that information in various ways.
Such benefits to the employer include the enrichment resulting from
defendant of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance and retention by the defendant of the benefit
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable . . . without the payment of its value.” Id.
284 See Jennifer M. Pacella, The Cybersecurity Threat: Compliance and the Role of
Whistleblowers, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 39, 45–46 (2016) (discussing
whistleblowing’s numerous “organizational benefits” to the employer).
285 Id.
286 See Mitchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d 462, 464–65 (7th Cir. 1952)
(recounting how a developer of gaming devices recovered following the defendant’s use of his
ideas in its products); De Filippis v. Chrysler Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977, 980–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1944),
aff’d, 159 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1947) (noting that it is “well settled” that inventors can recover
after disclosing their “novel” ideas to someone who subsequently betrays their confidence);
Thermo Trim, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 1973-367, 1977 WL 22873, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
1977) (holding that a plaintiff can recover if novel information was disclosed in confidence to
the defendant and that defendant made use of the information).
287 See e.g., Mitchell Novelty Co., 199 F.2d at 464–65; De Filippis, 53 F. Supp at 980–81;
Thermo Trim, Inc., 1977 WL 22783, at *4.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

61

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4

208

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:147

the avoidance of thousands or even millions of dollars in potential
compliance infractions, litigation, or other related problems.288 If an
employer that benefits from the employee’s information in this way
ultimately retaliates against that employee, it can then be said that
the employee is “impoverished,” as retaliation results in a clear loss
whether in the form of termination, harassment, loss of promotion,
or another identifiable retaliatory act—especially given the
expectation that the employee would be protected from
retaliation.289
The “connection” element of unjust enrichment would be satisfied
if the employee can establish that the employer inflicted retaliation
as a result of the employee’s transmission of information.290 It would
then be incumbent upon the employer to justify in some way the
retaliatory action that resulted therefrom.291 Finally, no legal
remedy exists for whistleblowers, as the types of situations
discussed in this Article would emerge in instances in which there
are no identifiable legal protections because the parameters of the
internal compliance program, policy, or code do not fit squarely
within the requirements of the applicable laws. Given the feasibility
of arguing that an unjust enrichment exists in such situations, a
quasi-contract claim is also a viable alternative for employees to
seek redress in this context.292 These alternatives to contract
theories would ensure that notions of fairness and justice are served
because employees would then be assured of legal protection in
instances in which they have complied with an employer’s policy
only to suffer retaliation as a result.

Cf. supra notes 274 and 284.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt & Pacella, supra note 33, at 671–73 (discussing the common types
of retaliation that whistleblowers experience); Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and
Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1762 (2007) (discussing various forms of retaliation
as defined by SOX); see also Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 285 (N.J. 1992)
(noting the requirement for an unjust enrichment claim that a plaintiff provide information
with the expectation of receiving something in return).
290 See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
291 Id.
292 Id.
288
289
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B. TORT-BASED APPROACH: WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY

Finding that traditional contract law offers few solutions to
combat the vulnerable whistleblower problem, we also propose
turning to tort law as a potential remedy, at least in a subset of
cases. Specifically, the tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy may offer protection to those whistleblowers who
experience the most extreme form of retaliation—termination. This
tort claim has been used only sporadically in whistleblower cases for
a variety of reasons, but with some new interpretation and
stretching of existing doctrine, it may prove beneficial.293
1. The Public-Policy Exception’s General Application. The
wrongful discharge tort is “currently recognized by all but a few
states.”294 It is essentially an exception to the at-will employment
doctrine that otherwise permits employers to terminate employees
for any reason so long as it is not unlawful.295 As one court stated,
“[f]iring for bad cause—one against public policy articulated by
constitutional, statutory or decisional law—is not a right inherent
in the at-will contract.”296 The tort’s purpose is clear—it “protects
employees against employer discrimination based on their actions
in support of public policy.”297 As Matt Bodie explains, the goal is to
encourage employee actions that benefit society at large: “[I]t
reminds us that employees are not only participants within their
firm, but also citizens within a larger community. Courts have thus
focused on adverse employer actions that ‘strike at the heart of a

See infra notes 303–306 and accompanying text.
William R. Corbett, Finding a Better Way Around Employment at Will: Protecting
Employees’ Autonomy Interests Through Tort Law, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 1071, 1084 (2018) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015)).
295 Id. at 1074 (“[F]orty-nine states in the nation adhere to the ‘doctrine’ of employment at
will, pursuant to which employers, in the absence of a contractual or statutory restriction,
may fire employees ‘for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.’”) (footnote omitted).
296 Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A
Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 589 (2004)
(quoting Murcott v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1095–96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)).
297 Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the Employment atWill Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 249–50.
293
294
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citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities.’”298 While courts
are somewhat reticent to interfere in an employer’s business
decisions, this tort is most effectively used when the employee’s
actions were clearly “socially advantageous” and are typically relied
upon for activities such as serving jury duty, participating in the
criminal justice process, abiding by professional ethics codes, and
the like.299 The Arkansas Supreme Court explained the
circumstances that would give rise to this tort as follows: “[P]ublic
policy is violated when the reason for the discharge is ‘so repugnant
to the general good as to deserve the label “against public policy.”’”300
When enforcing a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, courts typically look for a “clearly articulated, well
established or mandated” policy on which to rely.301 Courts resist
invitations to invent public policy or determine its existence based
on common sense.302 Instead, “[t]he sources of public policy typically
encompass constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions, and
administrative rules, regulations, and decisions” and “in certain
situations, the code of ethics of a profession.”303
Unsurprisingly, there is no shortage of cases examining whether
whistleblowing constitutes a protected activity under the public
policy exception to at-will employment. Whistleblowing typically
involves bringing to light unlawful activity, an action that itself
benefits the public interest: “As recognized by courts considering
298 Id. at 250 (footnote omitted) (quoting Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876,
878–79 (Ill. 1981)).
299 Id. (“As described by one court, ‘public policy must concern behavior that truly impacts
the public in order to justify interference into an employer’s business decisions.’” (quoting
Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1996))).
300 Michael D. Moberly, Cranking the Wrongful Discharge Ratchet: Judicial Abrogation of
Legislative Limitations on the Public Policy Exception, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 43, 66 (1999)
(quoting Smith v. Am. Greetings Corp., 804 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Ark. 1991)).
301 Cavico, supra note 296, at 590.
302 See id. at 591 (“One court underscored that ‘only in the most extraordinary
circumstances should the courts of this State impose their judgment in an area which, in the
first instance, is clearly a legislative function.’” (quoting Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins., No.
W1999-00942-COA-R9-CV, 2001 WL 204485, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2001), aff’d, 79
S.W.3d 528 (Tenn. 2002))).
303 Id. at 590 (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980)
(“Employees who are professionals owe a special duty to abide not only by federal and state
law, but also by the recognized codes of ethics of their professions. That duty may oblige them
to decline to perform acts required by their employers.”).
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this issue, ‘[p]ublic policy favors the exposure of crime, and the
cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge thereof is essential to
effective implementation of that policy.’”304 Courts tend to protect
employees who report violations of law that involve the “health and
welfare of the public.”305 The majority of cases in which
whistleblowers successfully rely on this tort involve workplace
safety, public health, and illegal or criminal activity by the employer
or government officials.306
There is some disagreement in the courts as to whether the
whistleblower must expose an actual legal violation or if a good faith
belief in such a violation is sufficient. As Frank Cavico explains, the
unearthing of unlawful activity is generally essential to these
claims, but “the conception of the common law doctrine is potentially
much more expansive so as to encompass moral and ethical
wrongdoing, presuming, of course, such misconduct, even though
not technically illegal, is serious enough to contravene the public
policy of the state.”307 Nonetheless, in many jurisdictions a
304 Id. at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting Dahl v. Combined Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 163,
167 (S.D. 2001)).
305 Id. at 593. Cavico notes that not all states have adopted a public policy exception for
whistleblowers, and some have adopted only narrow approaches. Id. at 593 n.257 (citing
several cases to demonstrate this); see, e.g., Szaller v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 153
(4th Cir. 2002) (“Maryland does not provide ‘a general “whistle blower” cause of action’ for an
at-will employee who reports a violation of federal or state law. And Congress has not created
one either. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to create such a protection
by expanding the wrongful discharge cause of action to all employees who are terminated for
reporting potential illegalities.” (citation omitted)); Terry v. Legato Sys., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d
566, 570 (D. Md. 2003) (“Maryland does not provide a general ‘whistle-blower’ cause of action
for an at-will employee who reports a violation of federal or state law.”); Storey v. Patient
First Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 431, 454–55 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that no Virginia statute
established a public policy with which the plaintiff’s termination interfered); King v.
Donnkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (W.D. Va. 2000) (“[T]here is no exception for
employees who are terminated for merely ‘blowing the whistle’ on an employer for violating
generalized regulatory mechanisms for business and industry.”); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v.
Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (establishing a “narrow exception” to the
employment-at-will doctrine only for “the discharge of an employee for the sole reason that
the employee refused to perform an illegal act”).
306 Cavico, supra note 296, at 592–93 (describing instances of whistleblowers successfully
using this cause of action).
307 Id. at 594. Cavico points to one jurisdiction whose “public policy whistleblowing cause of
action . . . include[s] ‘the reporting of illegal or improper conduct.’” Id. (quoting Jacobson v.
Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ill. 1998)).
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whistleblower must point to an actual violation of the law (as
opposed to the “employee’s reasonable or good faith belief”) in order
to rely on the public policy exception under tort law.308 However, as
Cavico points out, in at least one jurisdiction the court held that the
existence of a claim “did not turn on whether a law or regulation had
been violated but rather on whether an important public policy
interest embodied in the law benefited from the whistle-blowing.”309
The court was essentially focused on “whether [the employee’s]
complaints addressed an important public policy interest.”310 This
approach would be most useful in cases involving a whistleblower
report of a violation of the compliance code where the violation is
not itself criminal or unlawful and, as a result, typical legal
protections for whistleblowers do not apply.
2. Applying the Exception to Compliance Whistleblowers.
Expanding application of the wrongful discharge tort could provide
a useful form of protection for employees who report violations of
company compliance codes, whether they are reporting violations of
EEO codes, fraud and securities codes, or anti-bribery/corruption
codes. First, the employee’s behavior is socially advantageous when
he or she reports discriminatory, corrupt, or fraudulent behaviors to
the employer (and perhaps to government agencies or the general
public). Even if such acts do not necessarily rise to the level of illegal
activity, the unearthing of improper, immoral, or internally
prohibited conduct serves the public good defined broadly, as society
as a whole, and narrowly in terms of the particular workplace at
issue. In contrast, a legal system that permits the termination,
demotion, or some other form of punishment of those who report this
conduct—in contravention of company promises to protect or not
retaliate against the whistleblower—will likely detrimentally affect
both the workplace and society-at-large. If whistleblowers are
routinely disciplined or terminated for reporting prohibited conduct,
they will simply stop coming forward, leading eventually to an
increase in the bad behavior—meaning an increase in
discrimination, fraud, or corruption.311 Moreover, the suppression of
Id. at 597.
Id. (quoting Murcott v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 9 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)).
310 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Murcott, 9 P.3d at 1096).
311 See Eisenstadt & Geddes, supra note 94, at 184–85 (describing how retaliation ensures
potential whistleblowers remain silent).
308
309
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good faith complaints through threat of retaliation does not
eliminate the anger or other emotions that prompt whistleblowers
to come forward.312 Instead, those emotions fester in the employee
herself, are often spread to co-workers who cannot do anything to
improve the situation, and can create a toxic workplace
environment overall.313 This spread of negative emotions has longterm detrimental health and psychological impacts on both
employees and their friends and family.314 Allowing retaliation
against whistleblowers clearly impacts the public’s health and
welfare.
Benefits exist to relying on the wrongful discharge tort to protect
whistleblowers instead of a contract term—even of an implied
contract. Unlike a contractual provision, the employee cannot
bargain away or be coerced into relinquishing the wrongful
discharge claim. Were whistleblowers to turn to contractual
provisions in individual employment contracts or seek to rely on
company policies promising to protect those who report violations of
the company code, we suspect that it would not take long for
companies to begin inserting language (assuming they do not
already) that makes clear that such promises are not legally
enforceable.315 In contrast, the tort is focused on protecting the
public good and is not solely about the individual rights of a
particular employee. As a result, the tort of wrongful discharge can
withstand efforts by employers to insulate themselves from liability.
As William Corbett has explained in the context of protecting
employees’ autonomy interests against employer incursions: “the
tort, unlike the proposed default rule based on an implied
312 Id. at 185 (“It is uncontroversial to imagine that anger (and humiliation, fear, frustration
and a host of other negative emotions) is a likely result when one feels himself to be a victim
of harassment or some other form of discriminatory conduct. . . . [T]he anger continues to
negatively affect the employee’s mental and physical state regardless of the fact that it has
been suppressed.”).
313 Id. at 186 (describing how suppressed anger due to fears of retaliation can spread to
affect the workplace overall).
314 Id. at 188 (“Those harms are real, having been studied and documented, and they take
both psychological and physical forms and impact both the victims themselves as well as the
workplace overall.”).
315 See Fischl, supra note 261, at 195 (noting that employers responded to “the so-called
‘employee handbook’ exception to employment at will . . . by attempting . . . to opt back into
the employment-at-will rule via disclaimers of job security”).
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understanding, cannot be divested by an employer’s supposed
bargaining—and more likely coercion. This is the paramount
advantage because a protection that can be taken away by one party
is not much protection at all.”316
Importantly, for the wrongful discharge argument to be useful to
compliance whistleblowers, courts must extend the doctrine
somewhat.317 In general, courts look to constitutional provisions,
statutes, judicial precedent, and regulations as “sources of public
policy” on which to base the wrongful discharge tort.318 In limited
circumstances, courts have looked to “the code of ethics of a
profession” as an additional source of public policy.319 In the case of
whistleblowers adhering to internal policies, courts would be asked
to consider a company’s EEO, fraud, or anti-corruption code of
conduct as a source of public policy, too. A profession’s ethics code
creates clear expectations about industry standards and ethical
behavior; the same is true for a company’s compliance code. As
described above, these codes explicitly prohibit conduct, typically
encourage or require the reporting of violations of the code, and
routinely promise protection for those who report such conduct.320
While this constitutes a small expansion of existing doctrine, it
tracks existing approaches to establishing public policy and would
allow for a tort-based approach to hold companies accountable for
their policies. If companies reap the benefits of an internal
whistleblower alerting management to EEO violations, potential
fraud, and possible corruption, those whistleblowers should, in turn,
be protected from retaliation. Whistleblowers are explicitly playing
by company rules and providing important benefits to the company
and society at large.321 The wrongful discharge tort can and should
Corbett, supra note 294, at 1084 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 1076 (arguing that the wrongful discharge tort “although inadequate for the
task [of protecting employee autonomy interests] in its current form, can be modified and
fortified to fulfill this role”). We similarly argue that the tort can be modified slightly to protect
whistleblowers in our compliance-focused society.
318 Cavico, supra note 296, at 590.
319 Id. (citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 512, 512 (N.J. 1980) (“Employees who
are professionals owe a special duty to abide not only by federal and state law, but also by the
recognized codes of ethics of their professions. That duty may oblige them to decline to
perform acts required by their employers.”)).
320 See supra Sections II.B, III.B, & IV.B.
321 See supra notes 274 and 284.
316
317
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be expanded slightly to offer protection to these vulnerable
whistleblowers.
C. REGULATORY CHANGES CAN PROTECT WHISTLEBLOWERS
FOLLOWING INTERNAL POLICIES

In addition to individual solutions offered by alternatives to
contract theories and tort law, we also propose regulatory change as
a solution with broad, collective benefits. From a legislative and
regulatory perspective, it ultimately falls to Congress to protect
whistleblowers who report wrongdoing yet are not protected from
retaliation for disclosing the violations under state or federal law.322
In the absence of congressional action, other options exist to
increase protection indirectly; such options include modifications to
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations (the Sentencing
Guidelines), the DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs, and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations within the Justice Manual. Given their power to
shape the internal compliance function within companies,
amending these sources could significantly benefit whistleblowers.
The Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, apply specific sentencing ranges for corporations,
partnerships, non-profit entities, and other organizational units
that are convicted of criminal acts.323 The Sentencing Guidelines
delineate a number of considerations that can influence the severity
of the sentence received by an organization found criminally liable
due to criminal conduct committed by its employees.324 In
particular, if the organization has a compliance and ethics
program325 that meets effectiveness standards as defined in the
Sentencing Guidelines, the organization may receive a reduced

322 See, e.g., Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 998 (M.D. Tenn.
2012) (“[I]t falls to Congress to protect individual FCPA whistleblowers who are not otherwise
protected from retaliation under state or federal law for disclosing FCPA violations.”).
323 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018)
(explaining specific sentencing instructions for different organizations).
324 See id. § 8C2.5 (outlining the considerations that influence sentence severity).
325 The Sentencing Guidelines define a “[c]ompliance and ethics program” as “a program
designed to prevent and detect criminal conduct.” Id. § 8B2.1, cmt. 1.
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sentence.326 An “effective” program includes—among other factors—
an organization establishing, monitoring, and enforcing compliance
policies and procedures for its employees and agents, assigning
program responsibility to high-level personnel, and taking
appropriate steps to address offenses when detected.327
The Sentencing Guidelines ignited “a watershed moment for the
field of compliance and ethics,”328 as the Sentencing Guidelines
offered legal incentives and financial benefits for companies to adopt
and maintain effective compliance programs, and firms “quickly
realized” these benefits.329 Since the Sentencing Guidelines’ release
in 1991, the contemporary compliance function in organizations has
massively expanded in scope, organization, budgets, and staffing.330
Given its ability to shape the internal compliance function, the
Sentencing Guidelines could influence corporate behavior in
connection with whistleblower activity.331 Upon its next revision,
the Sentencing Guidelines could be modified to specifically address
whether a company adequately protects whistleblowers who report
conduct that seemingly violates internal compliance policies and to
determine the sufficiency of that company’s compliance program.
Such a modification may significantly affect willingness to engage

326 Id. § 8C2.5(f) (noting a reduced sentence for offering effective compliance and ethics
programs); see also Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability:
Qui Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law,
111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 655–56 (2007) (“As a result of these Guidelines, corporations
quickly realized the benefits offered by corporate compliance programs. Such programs could
not only deter criminal activity within the corporation, but also lessen the sentence imposed
on the corporation if criminal activity occurred.” (footnotes omitted)).
327 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)–(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018); see also Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 255 (2004) (discussing features of “effective” compliance
programs).
328 Paul E. McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 647, 654
(2018).
329 See Finegan, supra note 326, at 656.
330 Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2075, 2084, 2100–03 (2016) (describing the expansion of the role of contemporary compliance
programs since the Sentencing Guidelines’ passage).
331 CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS 1 (2020) [hereinafter DOJ EVALUATIONS], https://www.justice.gov/criminalfraud/page/file/937501/download (discussing how the Sentencing Guidelines evaluate
corporate behavior).
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in retaliatory conduct as a response to whistleblowing within an
organization.
The Department of Justice’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs provides another influential federal source delineating
relevant factors for evaluating corporate compliance programs.332
The guidance document lists topics that the DOJ Criminal Division
has found germane in its compliance program evaluations, and it is
organized around three questions: “First, is the program welldesigned? Second, is the program effectively implemented? And,
third, does the compliance program actually work in practice?”333
Section I.D of the guidance document notes, “Prosecutors should
assess whether the company’s complaint-handling process includes
proactive measures to create a workplace atmosphere without fear
of retaliation, appropriate processes for the submission of
complaints, and processes to protect whistleblowers.”334 Given its
existing emphases on “processes to protect whistleblowers” and
related “fear of retaliation,” this section could be expanded further
to identify adequate protection for whistleblowers who report
conduct that conflicts with internal corporate policies as a key
characteristic of an effective compliance program.335 Such a revision
would further signal the importance of whistleblower protection to
the private sector.
Finally, the Justice Manual’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations provides guidance to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
and reflects DOJ policy, mirroring the Evaluation of Corporate
Compliance Programs approach.336 Justice Manual section 9-

332 See id. at 2–4 (discussing the “fundamental questions” prosecutors must ask to
determine the effectiveness of compliance programs).
333 Press Release 19-452, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division Announces Publication of
Guidance on Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/criminal-division-announces-publication-guidanceevaluating-corporate-compliance-programs.
334 DOJ EVALUATIONS, supra note 331, at 6.
335 Id.
336
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 9-28.000,
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-businessorganizations#9-28.200 (last revised July 2019); see also Wick Sollers, Dan Sale, Christina
King & Kelli Gulite, DOJ Issues Updated U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, ABA (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/criminal/practice/2019/doj-issuesupdated-us-attorneys-manual/ (discussing updates to the Manual).
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28.800.B provides, “Prosecutors also should determine whether the
corporation’s employees are adequately informed about the
compliance program and are convinced of the corporation's
commitment to it.”337 This language could be expanded to directly
address the issue of whistleblower retaliation for reporting internal
compliance policy violations as a relevant factor when evaluating an
organization’s corporate compliance program. Harmonizing with
the revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines and the Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs, this modification of DOJ policy
would be another soft law approach, in the absence of congressional
action, to raise awareness and deter companies from retaliating
against their employees and other agents for reporting compliance
policy violations.338

VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed, across three separate contexts,
instances where an employer’s internal policies, codes of ethics,
compliance programs, or other organizational governing documents
exceed the requirements of federal laws and regulations, leaving
those who report wrongdoing vulnerable to retaliation without legal
protection. In the EEO industry, compliance has boomed and paved
the way for a plethora of policies that promote workplace diversity
and prohibit instances of sexual harassment and discrimination,
especially in light of the #MeToo and Black Lives Matter
movements.339 In the anti-fraud and securities regulation domain,
the 1990s amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines and the
passage of legislation like SOX and Dodd–Frank, as well as these
laws’ enhanced whistleblower protections, have each contributed to
the steady growth of compliance initiatives in this sector.340 Finally,
the FCPA’s enactment and a steady stream of anti-bribery
initiatives have caused a notable uptick in the anti-corruption

337 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 9-28.000, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.200 (last revised July
2019).
338 DOJ EVALUATIONS, supra note 331, at 1.
339 See supra Section II.A.
340 See supra Section III.A.
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compliance industry, resulting in expansive corporate anti-bribery
and anti-corruption internal policies.341
The steady growth of compliance initiatives in these sectors has
led to the vast expansion of organizational policies that
unfortunately exclude from retaliation protections a universe of
potential whistleblowers who adhere to their employers’ policies
only to be retaliated against by a rogue constituent.342 Such
situations exist because compliance, as defined by these internal
policies, exceeds the letter of the law.343 The most notable and onpoint federal statutes that would protect these employees and
whistleblowers have not caught up with the vast and widespread
adoption of compliance policies and programs.344 To remedy this
problem, we propose three solutions.
The first is based on contract law, namely alternatives to contract
theories. While it is difficult to successfully argue that a compliance
program or internal policy is a binding contract, doctrines like
promissory estoppel and quasi contract—which include elements of
reliance and unjust enrichment—are viable options for vulnerable
whistleblowers who are seeking legal redress.345 Second, a tortbased approach using a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy offers a potential remedy. Whistleblowing has long
been established as a strong public policy consideration that would
justify the application of this theory to the examples set forth
herein.346 Finally, regulatory changes would offer widespread,
collective protection. In addition to congressional action,
modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines, the DOJ Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs, and the Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations would incentivize companies
to protect vulnerable individuals when the requirements of their
employers’ compliance policies and programs exceed the boundaries
of the law.347 While the growth of compliance programs, codes, and
departments is a positive step in many ways, this development
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Sections II.B, III.B, IV.B.
343 See supra Parts II–IV.
344 Id.
345 See supra Section V.A.
346 See supra Section V.B.
347 See supra Section V.C.
341
342
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makes those who report wrongdoing vulnerable to retaliation
without legal protection. Through alternatives to contract theories,
tort law, and soft law initiatives, we propose means of righting this
wrong.
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